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11.01 Introduction*1

Scholars periodically note the impending upsurge in local oil and gas
regulation, offering various reasons for increased local action. Papers written only a few years ago attribute greater local action in the West to population growth, increased urbanization, and increased demand for energy. 2
Consider, however, more recent phenomena.
First, population migration from more liberal states to more traditionally conservative producing states likely plays a role, as new residents

* Cite as Alex Ritchie, "Creatures of Circumstance: Conflicts over Local Government
Regulation of Oil and Gas;' 60 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 11-1 (2014).
1 In developing this chapter, the author is indebted to Bruce M. Kramer, Adjunct Professor and Thompson Visiting Professor, University of Colorado School of Law, Prnfessor
Emeritus, Texas Tech University School of Law, and his extensive body of scholarship on
the local regulation of oil and gas. See, e.g., Bruce M. Kramer & Patrick H. Martin, The Law
of Pooling and Unitization § 4.05 (3d ed. 2013); Bruce M. Kramer, "The State of State and
Local Governmental Relations as it Impacts the Regulation of Oil and Gas Operations: Has
the Shale Revolution Really Changed the Rules of the Game?'' 29 J. Land Use & Envtl. L.
69 (2013) (Kramer: Governmental Relations); Bruce M. Kramer, "Local Land Use Regulation of Oil and Gas Development: Pumpjacks and Preemption;' 56 La. Mineral L. Inst.
198 (2009); Bruce M. Kramer, "Local Land Use Regulation of Oil and Gas Development:'
Surface Use for Mineral Development in the New West 5-1 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 2008)
(Kramer: Local Land Use Regulation); Bruce M. Kramer, "Local Land Use Regulation of
Extractive Industries: Evolving Judicial and Regulatory Approaches;' 14 UCLA}. Envtl. L &
Poly 41 ( 1996) (Kramer: Evolving Judicial Approaches). The author also greatly appreciates
the panelists who presented with the author at the 60th Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Institute and reviewed drafts: Matthew Lepore, Director, Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC); Terry R. Bossert, Vice President of Legislative & Regulatory
Affairs, Range Resources-Appalachia LLC; and Phillip D. Barber, Phillip D. Barber, P.C.
2 See

Michael J. Wozniak, "Home Court Advantage? Local Governmental Jurisdiction
Over Oil and Gas Operations;' 48 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 12-1, 12-3 to 12-7 (2002). See also
Jeffrey R. Fiske & Ann E. Lane, "Urbanization of the Oil Patch: What Happens When They
Pave Paradise and Put Up a Parking Lot?" 49 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 15-1 (2003) (encroachment of urban areas into oil patch).
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bring perspectives opposing drilling activity. 3 Second, while the suburbs
continue to expand into the oil patch, the oil patch has expanded into the
suburbs and urban areas as well. Hydraulic fracturing may be an "old"
technology,4 but it was little more than a decade ago that Devon Energy
(shortly after its acquisition of Mitchell Energy) began large-scale commercial production in the Barnett Shale that kicked off the "shale boom:·s
As evinced by the Barnett Shale, operators may produce this prolific new
source of production from underneath cities and towns. Third, "fracking"
is now commonly accused of dangers ranging from groundwater contamination6 to promiscuity and drug addiction. 7 Negative media reports8 and
well-organized public awareness campaigns9 trumpeting these dangers
have strongly influenced local residents and local politics. 10
Surface owners may oppose local mineral development for political reasons or personal predilections for environmental protection, or may simply
fulfill their role that forms the basis for modern economic theory-people
act with self-interest. 11 Average surface owners may support domestic oil
and gas production in general, but they may also be deeply and honestly
3 See

Hilary Boudet et al., " 'Fracking' controversy and communication: Using national
survey data to understand public perceptions of hydraulic fracturing;' 65 Energy Policy
57 (2014) (concluding based on survey results that conservative political ideology was a
positive predictor of support for hydraulic fracturing and liberal ideology predicted opposition); Alan Greenblatt, "How California ls Turning the Rest of the West Blue;' Nat'l Pub.
Radio (Aug. 29, 2013) ("Lots of Californians have moved to Denver and its environs, bringing a progressive strain of politics with them and angering more conservative parts of the
state ... :').
4 The

American Petroleum Institute (API) recently celebrated the 65th birthday of
hydraulic fracturing. See News Release, Zachary Cikanek, API, "API: Happy Birthday
Hydraulic Fracturing" (Mar. 17, 2014).
5 See

generally Discussion Paper, Zhongmin Wang & Alan Krupnick, "A Retrospective
Review of Shale Gas Development in the United States- What Led to the Boom?" (Res. for
the Future Apr. 2013).
6 See Kevin

Begos, Associated Press, "4 states confirm water pollution from drilling;' USA

Today (Jan. 5, 2014).
7 See,

e.g., Food & Water Watch, "The Social Costs of Fracking-A Pennsylvania Case
Study;' at 3- 4 (Sept. 2013) (Social Costs).
8 For example, The New York Times published an entire series on "the risks of natural-gas
drilling and efforts to regulate this rapidly growing industry:' See "Drilling Down;' N. Y.
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/us/DRILLING_DOWN_SERIES.html.
9 See,

e.g., Marcellus Protest, http://www.marcellusprotest.org; Fracking Colorado,
http://frackingcolorado.wordpress.com.
10 See Social
11 See

Costs, supra, note 7, at 4, 8.

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations I.2.2
(5th ed. 1904).
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concerned about the effects of drilling in their neighborhoods. Mineral
interest owners may be more concerned with lease revenues and private
property rights than externalities, but they simply are outnumbered in the
political process. Surface owners and occupants control the vast majority
of votes in sub-state unit elections. 12 The "public good" of oil and gas and
the "rights of the minor party" mineral interest owners and lessees, now
more than ever, face "the superior force of an interested ... majority:'13
In response to the intense public opposition to drilling, local legislatures
have enacted all manner of oil and gas ordinances. These may emerge as
traditional zoning ordinances that divide the sub-state unit14 into districts
and allow drilling only in specified locations or only by permit, 15 or as
performance standards for drilling, such as requirements relating to noise,
visual impacts, closed-loop systems, and hours of operations. 16 Alternatively, ordinances may ban outright either hydraulic fracturing specifically
or oil and gas operations in general. In a new trend, local voters, unsatisfied
with local legislative action, are taking matters into their own hands and
forcing ballot initiatives at both the local and state levels. 17
This chapter examines some of the more recent sub-state unit actions
to control oil and gas production, the law governing limitations on local
power, claims often asserted to challenge that power, and recent court decisions addressing that power in the oil and gas context. It also discusses
proposed compromise positions that may or may not be effective.
What will emerge is that courts may act no differently than other political actors. Even though sub-state units may be referred to as creatures
12 See Alex Ritchie,

"On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in New Mexico;' 54
Nat. Resources f. _ (forthcoming 2014).
13 James Madison, "The Federalist No. 10;· Daily Advertiser (Nov. 22, 1787). The actual
quote refers to "an interested and overbearing majority:' While the majority may be overbearing in the sense that it is asserting its will at the local level, the pejorative term "overbearing" implies a certain amount of tyranny or arrogance, demeaning concerns 10f local
citizens.
14See Kramer: Governmental Relations, supra note l, at 69 n.l. The term "sub-state unit"
is used throughout this chapter to describe not only cities and counties but also townships,
boroughs, and other local governments under the state.
15 Such

permits may be subject to one or more discretionary approvals by sub-state unit
administrative agencies. See id. at 73.
16 Id.

at 74.

17 Some commentators have argued that use of initiatives to decide land use questions
is inappropriate because voters do not deliberate, are subject to manipulation by special
interest groups, and lack the expertise. See, e.g., Marcilynn A. Burke, "The Emperor's New
Clothes: Exposing the Failures of Regulating Land Use Through the Ballot Box;' 84 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1453, 1460-61 (2009).
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of the state, courts often interpret constitutions and statutes to protect
local power. 18 Although courts have traditionally afforded deference to
traditional exclusionary zoning efforts, 19 more recently courts have gone
further, all but ignoring state statutory mandates that limit local power
based on findings that vary from legislative acquiescence, to narrow construction, to violation of state constitutional civil rights that protect the
environment.20
§ 11.02 The Recent Surge in Local Oil and Gas Regulation

The local regulation of oil and gas is not a new phenomenon. 21 But a survey of recent governmental actions, initiatives, and related lawsuits across a
number of producing states evinces an upsurge that is destined to expand
as proponents of local action move from community to community.
Although the author was unable to find a complete and accurate listing
of local prohibitions of oil and gas development and hydraulic fracturing,
a website hosted by an environmental organization that catalogues local
action "against fracking" counts approximately 435 varied ordinances. 22
The discussion in this section is by no means comprehensive, but instead
surveys some of the more publicized sub-state actions in a number of key
states, with the intention of describing a variety of forms of such actions.

18See

Richard Briffault, "Our Localism: Part I -The Structure of Local Government
Law;' 90 Colum. L. Rev. l, 112 (1990).
19 The

U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926), cemented judicial deference to zoning actions, with some exceptions. For a
discussion of the exceptions, see note 120, infra.
20 This

judicial approach to the protection of local power has been described by Professor Kramer as "reasonably activist" and "creative" in its attempts to avoid preemption. See
Kramer: Governmental Relations, supra note l, at 73.
21 Professor Kramer
22 These

provides a historical perspective oflocal regulation. See id. at 71-77.

include 19 such ordinances in California, 10 in Colorado, 1 in Connecticut, 1
in the District of Columbia, 2 in Florida, 1 in Hawaii, 7 in Illinois, 1 in Indiana, 1 in Iowa,
4 in Maryland, 1 in Massachusetts, 20 in Michigan, 2 in Minnesota, 36 in New Jersey, 3 in
New Mexico, 218 in New York, 27 in North Carolina, 37 in Ohio, 17 in Pennsylvania, 4
in Texas, I in Vermont, 10 in Virginia, 4 in West Virginia, 5 in Wisconsin, 1 in Wyoming,
and 2 "Indigenous" ordinances. Food & Water Watch, "Local Actions Against Fracking;'
https:/ /www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/ fracking/fracking-action -center/local-action documents/. It is unclear what is meant by a local action "against fracking" on the website.
Although the website certainly appears to track more than effective bans on oil and gas
development or hydraulic fracturing, it also appears to be both over- and under-inclusive.
The analysis of the website as to Pennsylvania ordinances was provided to the author by
Pittsburgh attorney Blaine Lucas of Babst Calland on June 9, 2014. Whether ultimately
over- or under-inclusive, the salient point is that there are now a great number of local oil
and gas ordinances that effectively ban oil and gas development.

§
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[I] Colorado
In the western United States, Colorado has become ground zero for the
hydraulic fracturing debate. 23 The state's conservative roots and long history of oil and gas development have collided with a new political reality,
pushed in part by people moving to the Denver metropolitan area from
the West Coast who desire to preserve the landscape that brought them
there. 24

[a] Longmont Ordinance and Voter-Approved
Ban
Local governments in Colorado for years have regulated various aspects
of oil and gas operations, but on November 6, 2012, voters in the City of
Longmont approved the first outright ban of hydraulic fracturing (Ballot
Question 300) in the state.25 The Longmont voter-initiated ban followed
the adoption by the Longmont City Council on July 17, 2012, of a controversial new oil and gas ordinance that replaced Longmont's 12-year-old
oil and gas regulations.26 Thirteen days after the ordinance was enacted,
the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC) filed suit
challenging the ordinance (Longmont I).27 The COGCC was then joined
in October 2012 by the Colorado Oil and Gas Association (COGA) as a
plaintiff intervenor. 28
In its Longmont I complaint, the COGCC alleged preemption of various provisions of the ordinance, including the City's ( 1) claimed right
to impose permit conditions based on the City's determination of the
"appropriateness" of multi-well sites and directional and horizontal drilling; (2) absolute prohibition on permits for surface operations and facilities in residential zoning districts; (3) separate chemical disclosure rules;

23 See "Shifting politics

fuel fracking debate in Colo.;' EnergyWire (May 24, 2013).

24See Greenblatt, supra note 3; Aldo Svaldi, "Net in-migration to Colorado from other
states growing;' Denver Post (Jan. 15, 2012).
25 See BallotPedia, "Longmont City Fracking Ban, Question 300 (November 2012);'
http://ballotpedia.org/Longmont_City_Fracking_Ban,_Question_300_{November_2012).
The ban was passed despite substantial campaign spending against the measure by the oil
and gas industry. See Scott Streater, "Colo. city passes fracking ban despite aggressive oil and
gas industry campaign;' Energy Wire (Nov. 7, 2012).

26City of Longmont,

Colo., Ordinance No. 0-2012-25 (July 17, 2012 ).

27 Complaint

for Declaratory Relief, COGCC v. City of Longmont (Longmont I), No.
2012CV702 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. July 30, 2012).
28 See Reply Briefin Support of COGA's Motion to Intervene, Longmont I, No. 2012CV702
(Oct. 9, 2012).
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(4) discretionary water sampling requirements; and (5) claimed authority

to determine whether an operational conflict exists with state law. 29
Despite its comprehensive permitting regime, community organizers
led by an organization called Our Health, Our Future, Our Longmont3o
believed the Longmont ordinance was not sufficiently protective because it
left open the possibility of hydraulic fracturing. The group gathered at least
6,609 signatures of registered Longmont voters on a petition requesting a
special election to amend the City Charter to ban hydraulic fracturing. 31
The voter-initiated hydraulic fracturing ban passed and COGA brought
yet another suit against Longmont (Longmont II),32 subsequently joining
the COGCC as a necessary party. 33 The Longmont I court then granted
a stay of COGCC's and COGXs challenge to Longmont's comprehensive
ordinance pending the outcome of the challenge in Longmont II to the
voter-initiated ban.34
On July 24, 2014, Boulder County District Court Judge D.D. Mallard
struck down the Longmont hydraulic fracturing ban based on conflicts
with state law. 35 Environmental groups appealed this decision to the Colorado Court of Appeals, and the ban remains in place pending the outcome
of the appeal. 36 Shortly after the ban was struck down, the State agreed to
dismiss its challenge in Longmont I to Longmont's comprehensive ordinance. 37 As of this writing, Longmont has in place both a comprehensive

29Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 27, at 8.
30 See http://ourlongmont.org.
31 See Longmont, Colo., City Council Resolution No. R-2012-67 (Aug. 28, 2012).
32 See

Complaint, COGA v. City of Longmont, No. 2012CV960 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Weld
Cnty. Dec. 17, 2012). Venue in the case subsequently was transferred to Boulder County,
Colorado. See COGA v. City of Longmont (Longmont II), No. 2013CV63 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Boulder Cnty.). See Tony Kindelspire, "Longmont granted change of venue in fracking ban
lawsuit:' Longmont Times-Call (Mar. 11, 2013).
33Qrder Re: COGCC Joinder, Longmont JI, No. 2013CV63 (July 18, 2013) (nunc pro tune
July l, 2013).
34 See Joe Rubino, "Longmont, Broomfield, Lafayette spend $100K defending fracking
bans;' Boulder Daily Camera (May 15, 2014).

35 0rder Granting Motions for Summary Judgment, Longmont II, No. 2013CV63,
2014 WL 3690665 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. July 24, 2014) (Longmont Order). See
§ 11.04[3] [b], infra.
36 See Cathy Proctor, "Longmont, other groups appeal judge's order that tossed city's
fracking ban;' Denver Bus. J. (Sept. 11, 2014).

31See § l l.02[l][c], infra.

§ 11.02[1][b]
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drilling ordinance and a voter-initiated ban, at least until the resolution of
the appeal.

[b] Boulder, Fort Collins, Broomfield, and
Lafayette
In November 2013, the City and County of Broomfield38 and the Colorado home-rule cities of Boulder39 and Fort Collins40 each imposed fiveyear oil and gas moratoria. The Broomfield and Fort Collins moratoria
are almost identical in language to the Longmont voter-initiated hydraulic
fracturing ban, except that the Broomfield and Fort Collins moratoria
expire after five years.
Also in November 2013, voters in the City of Lafayette adopted a "community rights ordinance" charter amendment4 1 with assistance from the
Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CELDF). 42 The ordinance prohibits a corporation from storing or transporting "materials ...
used in or resulting from the extraction of gas or oil" and makes it "unlawful for any corporation ... to engage in the creation of fossil fuel ... production and delivery infrastructures ... that support or facilitate industrial
activities related to the extraction of natural gas and oil:'43 It also strips
corporations that violate the oil and gas prohibitions of their personhood
rights under the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions, declares invalid permits
and licenses issued by COGCC that would violate the ordinance, and states
that corporations have no power to challenge the ordinance. 44

38 City & Cnty. of Broomfield, Colo., Charter Amend. (adopted Nov. 5, 2013), http://
www.broomfield.org/DocumentCenter/View/5636. Broomfield adopted comprehensive
new oil and gas regulations on September 24, 2013. See City & Cnty. of Broomfield, Colo.,
Ordinance No. 1986 (Sept. 24, 2013). Obviously, those regulations did not appease proponents of a ban or approximately half of registered voters.

39 City of Boulder,
4°Fort

Colo., Ordinance No. 7915 (Aug. 20, 2103).

Collins Public Health, Safety and Wellness Act (adopted Nov. 5, 2013).

41 City of Lafayette,

Colo., Ballot Question 300 (Nov. 5, 2013) (Lafayette Ballot Question

300).
42 See

Press Release, CELDF, "Residents in Lafayette, CO, Conclude Petition Drive for a
Community Rights City Charter Amendment to Ban Fracking" (July 5, 2013).
43 Lafayette

Ballot Question 300, supra note 41, at§ 2.3{i){2), (3).

44 Id. § 2.3{i)(6), (7), (8). Despite the support of voters, the Lafayette City Council
opposed the ordinance when it was proposed, finding that it was simply an effort to use
Lafayette to make political statements. See City of Lafayette, Colo., Resolution No. 2013-52
(Oct. l, 2013).
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On December 3, 2013, COGA filed suit, challenging their supposed lack
of power under the new Lafayette charter. 45 On the same day, COGA also
sued Fort Collins.46 COGA refrained from suing Boulder because of the
absence of active wells, 47 and as of this writing, has not sued Broomfield.
Broomfield was forced to litigate its election protocols after its ban passed
by only 17 votes. 48 The election results were upheld on February 27, 2014,
leaving in place the Broomfield ban. 49 In August 2014, after the Longmont
ban was struck down in Longmont II, both the Lafayette charter amendment and the Fort Collins ordinance were struck down as conflicting with
Colorado state law. so With its victories in the Longmont, Lafayette, and
Fort Collins cases, industry has a perfect 3-0 record challenging recent
voter-initiated bans in Colorado.
As described below, voter initiative proponents planned to extend their
efforts from city hall to the state house, but were thwarted, at least for the
time being, by a political compromise. 51

[c] Proposed Constitutional Amendment Ballot
Initiatives
In 2014, at least five amendments to the Colorado Constitution were
submitted by voters to the Secretary of State for the November 2014 ballot
that expressly allow local governments to prohibit oil and gas operations,5 2
45 Complaint, COGA v. City of Lafayette, Colo., No. 2013CV031746 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Boulder Cnty. Dec. 3, 2013). In response, CELDF has filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf
of voters of Lafayette against COGA and the State of Colorado claiming they are violating the citizens' constitutional rights to self-government by enforcing their legal rights. See
Press Release, CELDF, "Lafayette, Colorado, Residents File Class Action Lawsuit Against
State, Governor, and Colorado Oil and Gas Association: Asks Court to Overturn State Oil
and Gas Act and Dismiss Industry Lawsuit Against Lafayette'' (June 10, 2014).
46 Complaint,

COGA v. City of Fort Collins, No. 2013CV031385 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Larimer
Cnty. Dec. 3, 2013 ).
47 Ryan

Maye Handy, "State oil, gas association sues Fort Collins over fracking moratorium;' Coloradoan (Dec. 4, 2013).
4 8See

Megan Quinn, "Broomfield fracking: Recount finds 5-year ban wins by 20 votes;'

Boulder Daily Camera (Dec. 3, 2013); Peter Marcus, "Drilling away at fracking bans, lawsuits;' The Colo. Statesman (Dec. 20, 2013). See also Press Release, City of Broomfield,
"District Court Sustains Results of Broomfield Election Fracking Question'' (Feb. 27, 2014).
49 See

Leslie Jorgensen, "Broomfield Fracking Ban Upheld Despite 'Sloppy' Election;'

Colo. Observer (Feb. 28, 2014).
s0 see § 11.04[3][a], infra.
s 1 see § 11.02[l][c], infra.
52 See

Colo. Sec'y of State, "2013-2104 Initiative Filings, Agendas & Results;' Proposed
Initiative Nos. 82, 90, 91, 92, 93.

§
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two of which proclaim that such a local law "is not a taking of private property and does not require the payment of just compensation:, 53 Several
other proposals were submitted that would establish constitutional statewide setbacks of 1,500 to 2,640 feet from buildings. 54 The most publicized
proposal, submitted by the Colorado Community Rights Network, was so
broad that it would have allowed local governments to enact ordinances
that completely eliminate the rights and powers of corporations and other
business entities. 5 5
An additional proposal titled "Environmental Rights,, would have established the State and local governments as trustees, obligated to conserve
Coloradds environment. 56 Surely every voter in the state values the protection of the environment? With language reminiscent of the state constitutional amendment that was recently applied by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court to thwart preemption attempts in that state, 57 such an amendment
not only would have allowed sub-state unit control of oil and gas operations; it could also have created liability for the State or sub-state units that
chose not to exercise such control.
As the signature deadline approached, two of these ballot measures, a
mandatory 2,000-foot setback and the Environmental Rights amendment,
both backed by U.S. Congressman Jared Polis, appeared to have sufficient
signatures to appear on the November 2014 ballot. In addition, two counter initiatives that looked to move forward onto the ballot would withhold
severance tax revenue from communities that prohibited oil and gas production and require a fiscal impact statement for ballot initiatives.
On August 4, 2014, the day signatures for all of the ballot measures were
due, Governor John Hickenlooper engineered a grand bargain. Industry
and its supporters would withdraw their ballot initiatives. Congressman
Polis would ensure the withdrawal of the setback and environmental rights
initiatives. The State would drop its lawsuit challenging Longmont's drilling
ordinance in Longmont I (recognizing that Longmont's hydraulic fracturing ban had been overturned in Longmont II just a little more than a week
earlier). And Governor Hickenlooper would convene an 18-member task
force to make recommendations to his administration and the legislature

53 Id.

Nos. 90, 93.

54 Jd.

Nos.85,86,87,88.

55 Id.

No. 75.

56 Id.

No. 89.

57 See §

11.04[2], infra.
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as to oil and gas issues, drawing six members each from the environmental
community, industry, and civic leadership. 58
As of this writing, the Longmont, Lafayette, and Fort Collins bans have
all been struck down, the ballot initiatives are off the table, and industry in
Colorado has been largely spared from oil and gas and hydraulic fracturing
bans. The battle, however, between industry and groups opposed to oil and
gas development is not over, but just continued into 2015. Amendments
similar to the 2014 ballot initiatives in Colorado likely will reappear in
subsequent years. Further, the Colorado experience is instructive for other
states. Groups supporting these initiatives are likely to advance similar
proposals in other states, indicating that the war over local control of oil
and gas operations will be fought on two fronts, at both the courthouse and
the ballot box.

[2] New Mexico
[a] The Comprehensive Santa Fe County
Ordinance
The story oflocal control in New Mexico begins in Santa Fe. In 2007, Teeton Energy leased mineral rights under Galisteo Basin land. 59 In response
to the public outcry, Santa Fe adopted what is probably the most comprehensive drilling ordinance in the nation. 60 It is discussed in some detail
because of its effectiveness and because the form of the ordinance and its
lead author are making their way to other jurisdictions.61 The ordinance
has not been challenged in court. In fact, no operator has even applied for a
drilling permit in the county since its enactment. 62 With the great expense
required to apply for a permit and the procedural hurdles to make an asapplied claim, it may never be challenged. It has effectively banned drilling
while not actually stating that drilling was banned.
The ordinance is written as a zoning ordinance, and requires proposed
oil and gas drilling projects to go through a three-step process for approval:
58Lynn Bartels, "Let's make a deal: How Colorado came to a fracking compromise;' Den-

ver Post (Aug. 23, 2014).
59 See

Phaedra Haywood, "Commissioners Approve Oil-Gas Drilling Moratorium;'
Santa Fe New Mexican, Nov. 28, 2007, at C-1.
60 Santa

Fe Cnty., N.M., Ordinance No. 2008-19 (Dec. 9, 2008) (Santa Fe Ordinance).

61

See, e.g., Kay Matthews, "San Miguel County Ready to Regulate Oil and Gas Development;' La Jicarita (Sept. 17, 2013) (county working with lead author of the Santa Fe
Ordinance).
62 Presentation,

Stephen C. Ross, Cnty. Att'y, Santa Fe Cnty., N.M., 2nd Annual Conj on
Hydraulic Fracturing (CLE lnt'l Oct. 11, 2013) (stating in response to a question from the
audience that no permit applications have been submitted under the ordinance).

§ 11.02[2][a]
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(I) an oil and gas overlay zoning district classification must be extended
to the land where the oil and gas facility will be constructed; (2) after the
application for permit to drill is approved, a special use and development
permit with further conditions and requirements for well sites and structures must be applied for; and (3) applications must be filed for building or
grading permits and a certificate of completion. 63 The overlay zoning district application requires the preparation of eight detailed "studies, plans,
reports and assessments:' including a National Environmental Policy
Act-type environmental assessment that considers such matters as natural
wildlife and vegetation habitats, air and water pollution, and global warming.64 At the time of the application, the applicant must pay the County for
the cost of consultants (engaged by the County) to perform the studies. 65
The ordinance sets the maximum well density in the Galisteo Basin
at 10% of the number of wells that may be drilled under state rules in
"high sensitivity areas:' 30% in "moderate sensitivity areas:' and 40% in
"low sensitivity areas:' in each case stating that "fewer or no" wells may be
authorized. 66 After completing the overlay application stage, the applicant
must enter into one or more development agreements with the County.
The development agreements ( 1) cover the financing of capital facilities
and public services (as provided in the ordinance); (2) include the applicant's proportionate share of the construction and maintenance of roads; 67
(3) involve plans to fund the public water system's total projected water
supplies (taking into account the applicant project's existing and planned
water use) over a SO-year period;68 and (4) consider the project's impact on
the county's fire, police, and emergency services.69
Once operations are commenced, the ordinance requires dosed-looped
systems; baseline water quality testing, including at least three monitoring wells and samples from all water wells and surface water within three

63 Santa Fe Ordinance, supra note 60, at § 8.
64 /d. §

5. These include a general and area plan consistency report, an environmental
impact report, a fiscal impact assessment, an adequate public facilities and services assessment, a water availability assessment, an emergency service and preparedness report, a
traffic impact assessment, and a geohydrologic report. See id. § 9.

65 Id. § 9.6(3).
66Jd. §

9.4.4.1.

67 Jd. § 9.6.6.5.9.
68 Jd. § 9.6.5.3.
69 Jd. § 9.6.3.5.
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miles of the proposed well site; 70 annual water sampling to compare to
the baseline; 71 conducting operations from8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. only; 72
expanded setback requirements;73 and, subject to a minor exception, nothing in the fluid component of hydraulic fracturing material other than fresh
water, 74 making modern high-volume slick-water fracturing impossible.
The drafters of the 110-page (plus exhibits) ordinance carefully considered preemption, using all available room under existing state case law for
concurrent local jurisdiction. They addressed the potential of a regulatory
taking, stating that each applicant that is denied at the overlay zoning or
special use and development permit stage must "exhaust all administrative remedies by applying for a beneficial use and value assessment" that
describes the extent of the diminution of use and value of the property, the
distinct investment-backed expectations, the availability of transferable
development rights, and "any variance or relief necessary to relieve any
unconstitutional hardship or regulatory taking created:' 75 In other words,
the ordinance includes a method to avoid litigation if the claimant presents
convincing evidence of a takings claim.

[b] The Mora County Ban
On April 29, 2013, the Board of County Commissioners (Commissioners) in Mora County, New Mexico adopted a CELDF "community rights
ordinance" 76 similar to the Lafayette, Colorado charter amendment. 77 Like
the Lafayette amendment, the Mora ordinance bans a corporation from
producing oil and gas, extracting water to produce oil and gas, storing or
transporting produced water, or creating infrastructure that supports or
facilitates oil and gas extraction. 78 Also similar to the Lafayette ordinance,
the Mora ordinance denies personhood rights to corporations under the
U.S. and New Mexico Constitutions, and states that corporations should

70 Id. §

11.22.

71 Id. §

11.22.3.

72 Id. §

11.25.2.

73 Id. §

11.26.

74 Id. §

11.25.4.

75Jd.

5.

§

76 Mora

Cnty., N.M., Ordinance No. 2013-01 (Apr. 29, 2013) (Mora Ordinance).

77 See §

l l.02[l][b], supra.

78 Mora

Ordinance, supra note 76, at§§ 5.1-.4.
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not be afforded protections under the Commerce or Contracts Clauses of
the U.S. Constitution. 79
The Mora ordinance, however, also denies corporations rights under
the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution80 and contains
rather extreme protective provisions. If the ordinance is overturned, a
six-month moratorium automatically goes into effect, during which time
the Commissioners must adopt another ordinance banning hydrocarbon
extraction. 81 If an attempt is made to preempt or overturn the ordinance,
the county must consider measures to expand local control, which "may
include" secession from the state or the nation. 82 And despite that the
ordinance was adopted by only two of three Commissioners, repeal of the
ordinance requires a unanimous vote of the Commissioners followed by a
referendum of two-thirds of the Mora County electorate. 83
On November 11, 2013, a group of plaintiffs, including three mineral
owners and the Independent Petroleum Association of New Mexico
(IPANM) (collectively, IPANM Plaintiffs), filed suit against Mora County
challenging the ordinance in federal district court. The plaintiffs alleged
violations under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution, and that the ordinance was preempted. 84 On January 1, 2014,
a subsidiary of Shell Oil Company (Shell) followed up with its own suit
in federal district court. In addition to the claims made by the IPANM
Plaintiffs for declaratory and injunctive relief, Shell alleged violations of
the Supremacy and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, the
dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and that the ordinance effects a taking of property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, entitling the plaintiff to money
damages. 85

[3] NewYork
Although local regulation has increased in western states such as Colorado, New Mexico, and even Texas, eastern states such as New York present
79 Id. §

5.5.

80Jd.
81 Id.§

8.5

82Jd.

§

11.

83Jd.

§

10.

84 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Vermillion v. Mora Cnty., No. l:13-cv01095 (D.N.M. Nov. 11, 2013), 2013 WL 6235573.
85 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief & Damages, SWEPI LP v. Mora Cnty.,
No. l:14-cv-00035 (D.N.M. Jan. 10, 2014), 2014 WL 465657.
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even greater challenges for operators. According to the anti-fracking website "FracTracker;' 77 municipalities in New York have banned high-volume
hydraulic fracturing and 101 more have enacted moratoria. 86
The bans adopted by the Towns of Dryden and Middlefield, which are
considered in the preemption cases discussed below,87 are illustrative in
their simplicity. The zoning ordinance enacted by Middlefield states that
"all oil, gas or solution mining and drilling are prohibited uses:'88 Dryden's
ordinance similarly prohibits oil and gas exploration, development or
production,89 but also purports to invalidate any permit issued by a federal
or state government that would violate its prohibitions. 90
As Dryden and Middlefield continue to litigate, local conflicts in New
York have been overshadowed by New York's rolling statewide de facto
moratorium. In 1992, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (NYDEC) prepared a generic environmental impact statement
(GEIS) associated with oil and gas drilling operations under the State
Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQR). 91 On July 23, 2008, then
Governor David Paterson directed the NYDEC to prepare a supplemental
GEIS (SGEIS) to update the 1992 GEIS to address the potential impacts
of high-volume hydraulic fracturing (HVHF). 92 Following issuance of this
directive, the NYDEC announced that it would not process any further
86 FracTracker

Alliance, "Current High Volume Horizontal Hydraulic Fracturing Drilling Bans and Moratoria in NY State;' http://www.fractracker.org/map/ny-moratoria/. The
website also states that in 87 more New York municipalities, there are "movements" for bans
or moratoria, although it is not entirely clear how the website counts a "movement:' See id.
87 See

§ 11.04 [ 1][a], infra.

88 Town

of Middlefield, N.Y., Local Law No. l, at art. V.A (June 14, 2011). "Gas, Oil, or
Solution Drilling or Mining" is defined in part as "[t]he process of exploration and drilling
through wells or subsurface excavations for oil or gas, and extraction, production, transportation, purchase, processing, and storage of oil or gas, including, but not limited to ... :'
Id. at art. 11.B.7.
89 Town of Dryden, N.Y., "Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Zoning Ordinance;'
§ 2 (Aug. 3, 2011) (amending article XXI of the Town of Dryden Zoning Ordinance to add
a new section 2104).

90Jd.
91 N.Y.

Envtl. Conserv. Law§§ 8-0101 to -0117. See NYDEC, "Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Regulatory Program'' (July
1992). See also N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 617.l(c) ("SEQR requires that all
agencies determine whether the actions they directly undertake, fund or approve may have
a significant impact on the environment, and, if it is determined that the action may have a
significant adverse impact, prepare or request an environmental impact statement:').
92 See

Press Release, Governor of New York, "Governor Paterson Signs Bill Updating
Oil and Gas Drilling Law; Pledges Environmental and Public Health Safeguards" (July 23,
2008).
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permit applications using horizontal drilling combined with HVHF until
the SGEIS was completed, thus beginning the moratorium.
The NYDEC released the draft SGEIS for public review and comment
on September 30, 2009. 93 More than a year later, on December 13, 2010,
Governor Paterson issued an executive order directing the NYDEC to conduct further environmental review and to complete a revised draft SGEIS
by June l, 2011. His executive order also stated that permits would not
be issued until completion of a final SGEIS. 94 Newly elected Governor
Andrew Cuomo then continued the Paterson executive order on January
l, 2011. 95
After four years of study, the SGEIS was further delayed when the NYD EC
asked the state health commissioner to assess the NYDEC's analysis of the
health effects ofHVHF. 96 Despite a statement by Governor Cuomo in May
2013 that the study would be completed "in the next several weeks:' more
recent statements indicate his administration is in no hurry to issue the
report or to make a decision on whether to lift the moratorium. 97
Norse Energy Corporation (Norse), a plaintiff in the Dryden preemption
case discussed below, 98 has declared bankruptcy, and the court of appeals
has allowed the substitution of the Chapter 7 trustee for the plaintiff. 99
In addition to the preemption case, the Norse trustee has filed a separate
lawsuit alleging that the bankruptcy was caused by the intentional delay
of Governor Cuomo and the NYDEC in issuing regulations to govern
hydraulic fracturing. The trustee argues it was purely a political decision to
continue the moratorium. 100
93 See

Governor ofN.Y., Exec. Order No. 41 (Dec. 13, 2010).

94Jd.
95 See

Governor ofN.Y., Exec. Order No. 2 (Jan. l, 2011).

96 See

Mireya Navarro, "New York State Plans Health Review as It Weighs Gas Drilling;'

N.Y. Times (Sept. 20, 2012).
97 See

Jesse McKinley, "Still Undecided on Fracking, Cuomo Won't Press for Health
Study's Release;' N. Y. Times (Dec. 16, 2013).
9 8See §
99 See

ll.04[l][a], infra.

Matter of Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 4 N.E.3d 363 (N.Y. 2013) (mem.).

100 The

Norse trustee has requested (1) a mandamus to compel finalization of the SGEIS
process, (2) a declaratory judgment that the NYDEC has acted arbitrarily and capriciously
and improperly delegated its responsibilities to the health commissioner, and (3) a declaratory judgment that Governor Cuomo has interfered with the SGEIS process. See Amended
Verified Petition & Complaint, Wallach v. NYDEC, No. 677013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 2014),
2014 WL 1883213. See also Marlene Kennedy, "Driller Demands Rules on N.Y. Fracking;'
Courthouse News Serv. (Dec. 23, 2013).
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A group called the Joint Landowners Coalition of New York, claiming to
represent over 70,000 landowners, also has filed suit against the State and
Governor Cuomo seeking to compel the NYDEC to complete its review. 101
Governor Cuomo could be waiting to make a decision for the completion
of yet another election cycle. If the NYDEC finishes its review and lifts the
moratorium, the holding by the New York Court of Appeals in the appeal
of the Dryden and Middlefield cases 102 in favor oflocal government power
arguably lessens the political fallout, especially considering the number of
local bans in place in New York.

[4] Pennsylvania
On November 16, 2010, the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, became
the first sub-state unit in the nation to adopt a CEDLF "community rights"
ordinance that banned oil and gas activity. 103 Since that time, a number
of other municipalities in Pennsylvania have adopted local drilling ordinances.104 In response to the patchwork of local ordinances, on February
14, 2012, the Pennsylvania legislature repealed and replaced Pennsylvania's
Oil and Gas Act of 1984 with a codified statutory framework to regulate oil
and gas operations referred to as "Act 13:'105 As discussed below, portions
of Act 13 were struck down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on state
constitutional grounds, and the court remanded to the commonwealth
court to determine whether the remaining valid portions were severable. 106

[5] Texas
Even oil and gas friendly Texas recently has seen local governments
respond to citizen concerns over fracking. Municipalities have been particularly active in the Barnett Shale where drilling occurs close to urban
and suburban populations surrounding Dallas and Fort Worth. Fort Worth
was the first city in Texas to deal directly with highly urbanized shale gas
drilling. 107 The City of Fort Worth has a comprehensive 66-page oil and
101 Joseph de Avila, "Pro-Fracking Group Sues New York Gov. Cuomo;'

Wall St. J. (Feb.

14, 2014).
102See

§ l l.04[l][a], infra.

103 City of Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance No. 37-2010 (eff. Dec. l, 2010) (codified at Pittsburgh Code§§ 618.01-.09).
104Food & Water Watch contains copies of 17 local ordinances in Pennsylvania against
hydraulic fracturing. See Food & Water Watch, supra note 22.

105 See 2012 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2012-13 (H.B.

1950) (Act 13) (codified at 58 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. §§ 2301-3504).
106See

§ ll.04[2][c], infra.

107 See Alex Macon, "Drilling industry evolves in Dallas-Fort Worth area;' North Texas
Daily (Oct. 27, 2011).
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gas ordinance that was consolidated and reenacted in 2009, 108 but it is
much more forgiving to industry than the new Dallas ordinance discussed
below. The Fort Worth ordinance generally prohibits wells to be drilled
within 600 feet of a residence, religious institution, hospital, school or public park, but it also allows for a waiver of the setback requirement from the
City Council or from property owners located within the 600-foot radius
of the well. 109 A proposal submitted to the City Council in October 2011 to
strengthen Fort Worth's ordinance was unanimously rejected. 110
On December 11, 2013, by a nine-to-six vote, the Dallas City Council
amended its development code to significantly revise its oil and gas drilling
and production regulations. 111 Among many other stringent provisions,
the revised ordinance requires a 1,500-foot setback from any "protected
use:' which may be reduced to 1,000 feet by a vote of two-thirds of the City
Council. 112 Because of the already extensive development of "protected
uses" in Dallas, industry and dissenting council members complained
that the new setback requirements, in particular, constituted a virtual ban
on drilling. 113 In contrast, supporting council members (and most of the
public speakers at the meeting where the ordinance was adopted) voiced
concerns for health and safety. 114 The City already has been sued, but not
10 8 City of Fort

109 Id.

Worth, Tex., Ordinance No. 18449-02-2009 (Feb. 3, 2009).

§ 15-36.A.

110Mayor

and Council Communication No. G-17422. See Minutes, City of Fort Worth,
Tex. Regular City Council Meeting, at 18 (Oct. 25, 2011).
111 City of Dallas,
112 Id.

Tex., Ordinance No. 29228 (Dec. 11, 2013).

§ 5 (amending Dallas City Code§ 51A-4.203(b )(3.2)(F)(ii)).

113 See Randy

Lee Loftis, "Dallas OKs gas drilling rules that are among nation's tightest;'

Dallas Morning News (Dec. 11, 2013). Council member Kleinman, who opposed the change
to the setback requirements, complained:
Our ordinance as was proposed by the Task Force was already one of the strongest
and most protective ordinances in this country, but that just wasn't enough ....
We might as well save a lot of paper and write a one-line ordinance that says there
will be no gas drilling in the City of Dallas. That will be a much easier ordinance
to have.
Minutes of Dallas, Tex. City Council Meeting, 2:22:34 (Dec. 11, 2013) (Dallas Minutes)
(audio recording).
114

See Loftis, supra note 113. Councilmember Caraway, who supported the ordinance,
stated:
[T]his has been something on our plate for the last two years plus, and to move
nowhere is a disservice to the city and to all citizens. . . . [I] f we were to put this
thing off any further we would still have the City of Dallas and all citizens in
harm's way ....
Dallas Minutes, supra note 113, at 2:30: 18.
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to challenge its regulatory authority. The City denied drilling permits to
Trinity East Energy (Trinity) to drill on lands that Trinity had leased from
the City itself, apparently for $19 million in lease payments. In addition
to its inverse condemnation claim, Trinity claims breach of contract and
fraud based on alleged representations made by the then City Manager,
Mary Suhm, when Trinity leased the property. 115
On July 16, 2014, the City Council of the City of Denton, Texas, which
sits atop the Barnett Shale, decided to put a petition on the November 4,
2014, ballot for voters to decide whether to ban hydraulic fracturing in
the city. If the ballot initiative is successful, Denton will be the first city in
Texas to ban hydraulic fracturing. 11 6
§

11.03 The Legal Authority of Local Governments to Regulate
Oil and Gas and Challenges to That Authority
[1] Source of Local Authority to Regulate Oil and Gas

Cities, counties, townships, boroughs, and other sub-state units may
regulate oil and gas development by enacting (1) zoning ordinances under
a grant of zoning power or (2) stand-alone oil and gas regulations under a
general grant of the police power. Although difficult to define, the police
power has been described as "the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, health, morals and the general welfare
of society within constitutional limits:' 117 The source of the zoning power
or the general police power depends on both the nature of the sub-state
unit and the specific language of the grant. It also depends on whether
the sub-state unit has been granted home rule powers or is a general law
statutory unit.
The police power and zoning power are related. In many states, zoning
has been upheld as an extension of the general police power of sub-state
units, 118 although most states authorize zoning under separate zoning
115 See

Nicholas Sakelaris, "Trinity East Energy sues the city of Dallas over breach of
contract for denied wells:' Dallas Bus. J. (Feb. 13, 2014).
116 See Mike Lee,

"Texas town's fracking ban will go to voters;' Energy Wire (July 16, 2014).

117 6 Patrick J. Rohan & Eric Damian Kelly, Zoning & Land Use Controls§ 35.03 (2013).
See Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W2d 877,883 (Mo. 1962); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S.

814, 818 (1879) ("It is always easier to determine whether a particular case comes within
the general scope of the power, than to give an abstract definition of the power itself which
will be in all respects accurate:').
118See,

e.g., Four States Realty Co. v. Baton Rouge, 309 So. 2d 659 (La. 1975); Coffee
City v. Thompson, 535 S.W2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Forks Twp. Bd. of Supervisors v.
George Calantoni & Sons, Inc., 297 A.2d 164 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972); Maldini v. Ambro,
330 N.E.2d 403 (N.Y. 1975); Hausmann & Johnson, Inc. v. Berea Bd. ofBldg. Code Appeals,
320 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
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enabling acts. Colorado, for example, has conferred broad authority on
local governments to plan for and regulate the use of land within their
respective jurisdictions. 119
Zoning enjoys a revered place in constitutional jurisprudence. While a
few courts have taken a harder look at cases of exclusionary zoning and
absolute prohibitions of lawful activities, 120 since the 1926 decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 121 most courts take a deferential view
of zoning regulations. In the first U.S. Supreme Court case upholding local
zoning on constitutional grounds, the Court stated that "reserving land
for single-family residences preserves the character of neighborhoods,
119 See

Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, La Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc., 830 P.2d
1045, 1056 (Colo. 1992). Colorado has adopted the Local Government Land Use Control
Enabling Act of 1974, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-20-101 to -108, the purpose of which is to
"provide broad authority to local governments to plan for and regulate the use of land
within their respective jurisdictions;' considering both "orderly development" and "legitimate environmental concerns:' Id.§ 29-20-102(1). The statute authorizes sub-state units to
regulate land use to accomplish multiple purposes, including the lessening of the impact
of various uses on the surrounding areas, protecting wildlife, and "[p]reserving areas of
historical and archaeological importance:' Id. § 29-20-104(l)(c). The County Planning
Code, id.§§ 30-28-101 to -139, grants counties the authority to adopt zoning resolutions
designed to regulate land use, which must promote "health, safety, morals, convenience,
order, prosperity, or welfare ... :' Id. § 30-28-115(1 ). Similarly, the Municipal Planning
Code, id. §§ 31-23-301 to -314, governs zoning by municipalities, providing that zoning
must promote health and general welfare and consider the character of the district and its
suitability for particular uses and encourage the most appropriate use of land throughout
the municipality. Id. § 32-23-303(1).
12°Courts

may look more closely where a particular type of use is completely excluded
or prohibited. In the Pennsylvania case of Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 228 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1967), the court required a more substantial relationship to public
health and safety where a type of business is completely excluded rather than confined to
a particular zone. Id. at 179. California also has a number of older cases that struck down
local prohibitions on quarrying. See, e.g., Ex parte Kelso, 82 P. 241, 242 (Cal. 1905) ("So far
as such use of one's property may be had without injury to others, it is a lawful use, which
cannot be absolutely prohibited ... under the guise of the exercise of the police power:');
People v. Hawley, 279 P. 136, 144 (Cal. 1929) (excavation of rock "cannot be prohibited"
unless necessary to protect legal rights of others); Morton v. Superior Court, 269 P.2d 81
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (quarrying not a nuisance per se and cannot be outlawed altogether). However, in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 342
(Cal. 1962), the court distinguished these older cases, finding consistent with Euclid that if
"reasonable minds may differ" as to the necessity and propriety of the legislative action, the
ordinance must stand. Id. at 352. See also Kramer: Evolving Judicial Approaches, supra note
l, at 60. Finally, Michigan had adopted a rule that zoning ordinances preventing mineral
extraction could be challenged by a showing that "no very serious consequences" would
result from the extraction. Silva v. Ada Twp., 330 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Mich. 1982). But this
"preferred use" test has been overruled as both violating separation of powers (by unduly
impeding legislative function) and superseded by state statute. Kyser v. Kasson Twp., 786
N.W.2d 543, 560 (Mich. 2010).
121 272

U.S. 365 (1926).
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securing 'zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people: "122 In analogizing to nuisance, the Court referred to undesirable uses as "merely a right
thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard:' 123
Professor Kramer has described the deferential standard from Euclid as the
"fairly debatable" test, 124 because "the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes" need only be "fairly debatable'' to survive judicial
scrutiny. 125

[a] General Law Local Governments as State
Creatures
Until the home rule movement, the "Dillon Rule" provided the foundational statement of the state-local relationship. Under this rule, a local government possesses and can exercise only those powers expressly granted,
necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the powers expressly granted,
or essential to the indispensable purposes of the local government. 126 For
this reason, statutory or "general law" sub-state units may be referred to as
"creatures" that may be created or destroyed at the whim of their state government creator. 127 These general law sub-state units therefore may enact
zoning ordinances and other land use controls only pursuant to express or
implied delegation of that power under enabling statutes or general constitutional provisions. 12s

[b] Home Rule
In contrast to general law sub-state units, home rule local governments
possess broader authority. Home rule powers may be classified as either
122 City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1995) (quoting Vill. of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)).
12 3 Euclid,

272 U.S. at 388.

l24Kramer: Evolving Judicial Approaches, supra note 1, at 44, 63.
12s Euclid,

272 U.S. at 388.

126John F.

Dillon, Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations§ 237 (1st ed. 1872).

127 See

Kramer: Governmental Relations, supra note 1, at 69; Huntley & Huntley, Inc.
v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 862 (Pa. 2009) ("Municipalities are creatures of the
state and have no inherent powers of their own. Rather, they 'possess only such powers of
government as are expressly granted to them and as are necessary to carry the same into
effect:" (quoting City of Phila. v. Schweiker, 858 A.2d 75, 84 (Pa. 2004))).
128 Rohan

& Kelly, supra note 117, at § 35.05. See also State ex rel. Vaughn v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs, 825 P.2d 1257, 1259 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) ("We begin with the premise that the
power of local government to zone does not derive from common law; rather, such power
can only be exercised pursuant to statutory authority and in conformity with a lawfully
adopted ordinance:').
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(1) imperio or (2) legislative, but the powers of imperio home rule units and
legislative home rule units are not materially different. Although the classification affects the analysis, both as to the source of the unit's power to
regulate and as to whether the legislature or the courts decide the scope of
that power, the state may preempt either type of sub-state unit depending
on the circumstances.
Imperio (or traditional) home rule is the original form of home rule. It
began in 1875 under the Missouri Constitution and applied to the single
city of St. Louis. 129 This original form obtained its name from the Supreme
Court, which described St. Louis as an "imperium in imperio" (a state
within a state). 130 Imperio home rule is an exception to the "creature"
theory because these sub-state units govern their affairs without need for a
grant of authority from the state legislature. Instead, these units derive their
authority from the state constitution and their own charter. California131
and Colorado 132 are examples of imperio home rule states. The authority
of an imperio home rule unit extends only to its local affairs, the scope of
which may be challenged. The boundaries of local authority in an imperio
home rule state are left to judicial determination. 13 3

The other form of home rule, legislative home rule, is now more common than the original form of imperio home rule. Legislative home rule
was introduced in the 1950s by the American Municipal Association with
a proposed model state constitutional provision, which was revised in 1968
by the National Municipal League. 134 A number of states adopted legislative constitutional provisions following the National Municipal League

129 John

Martinez, 1 Local Government Law§ 4:5 (2013).

130 st.

Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893). St. Louis prepared a charter
self-appointing its powers. So far as the charter and powers granted to the city did not conflict with the state constitution and laws, and have not been set aside by the state legislature,
the powers were vested in the city. Id. at 467-68.
1 3 1 Cal.

Const. art. XI, § 5(a).

132 See Colo. Const. art. XX,
and municipal matters").

§

6 (the charter is its organic law and extends to all "local

133 See

Kenneth Vanlandingham, "Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA
(NLC) Model;' 17 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. l, 2 ( 1975).
134Nat'l

Mun. League, Model State Constitution 16 (6th ed. 1963). The description of the
evolution from imperio to legislative home rule is described in City of New Orleans v. Board
of Commissioners, 640 So. 2d. 237,243 (La. 1994).
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model, including New Mexico, Montana, and Alaska, 135 that require the
state legislature to deny or prohibit a local government's particular exercise
of legislative power in order to override that power. 136 Under a grant of
legislative home rule, the home rule sub-state unit may exercise the police
power of the state, except that the legislature may deny local authority by
state statute as to most substantive powers and functions. 137 The goal of
this legislative home rule movement was to remove the discretion of the
court under the imperio home rule model as to what constitutes a matter
of "local" concern, and instead vest the state legislature with the decision
whether a particular matter should be regulated at a state or local level. 138
This goal, however, arguably has not been realized. As discussed below,
courts in legislative home rule states continue to discern whether state laws
are of general applicability and whether local laws impliedly conflict with
such general state laws.

[c] The Increase in Local Government Power
Originally intended only for municipalities, at least 32 states now provide home rule power to at least some of their counties, 139 undermining

135 N.M.

Const. art. X, § 6(D) (''A municipality which adopts a charter may exercise all
legislative powers and perform all functions not expressly denied by general law or charter:'); Alaska Const. art. X, § 11 (''A home rule borough or city may exercise all legislative
powers not prohibited by law or by charter."); Mont. Const. art. XI, § 6 (''A local government
unit adopting a self-government charter may exercise any power not prohibited by this constitution, law, or charter. This grant of self-government powers may be extended to other
local government units through optional forms of government provided for in section 3:').
136 According

to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the 1974 home rule amendments to the
Louisiana Constitution limit the powers of pre-1974 home rule municipalities only to contrary provisions of the Louisiana Constitution and their own charters, while new home rule
cities and parishes are subject to general state law, even if passed after the charter. See City
of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 247. See also G. Roth Kehoe II, "City of New Orleans v. Board
of Commissioners: The Louisiana Supreme Court Frees New Orleans from the Shackles of
Dillon's Rule:' 69 Tul. L. Rev. 809, 818-19 (1995). Despite this broad interpretation of home
rule, however, local governments are completely preempted from regulating oil and gas
operations in Louisiana. See§ 11.04[3] [c], infra.
137 Vanlandingham,

supra note 133, at 3. Early court decisions interpreting imperio home
rule have been characterized, consistent with the Dillon Rule, as hostile toward home rule
or highly deferential to legislative interventions. See, e.g., City of New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at
242-43 (citing Bishop v. San Jose, 460 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1969); Cnty. Sec. v. Seacord, 15 N.E.2d
179 (N.Y. 1938); Van Gilderv. City of Madison, 267 N.W. 25 (Wis. 1936)).
138 See David J.
139 The

Barron, "Reclaiming Home Rule;' 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2326-27 (2003 ).

list of states that authorize county home rule include the producing states of
Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma.
For a list of states that authorize municipal and county home rule, see Ballotpedia, "Chartered local government:' http://ballotpedia.org/Chartered_local_government. The list is a
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the importance of the "creature" theory. Further, most states grant general
law statutory counties the zoning power and many states now delegate to
cities and counties the police power. Colorado and New Mexico, for example, grant counties both zoning power and the police power. 140 Oklahoma
grants counties planning authority, and grants counties with a population
of 500,000 or more zoning powers for police power purposes, but does not
grant counties blanket police powers. 141 Drilling is more certain in rural
Texas, where counties lack the ability to zone. 142 The vesting of counties
with zoning power and home rule power and the delegation of the police
power to both counties and cities has over time increased the regulatory
burden on oil and gas operators. 143 Fewer and fewer drilling locations exist
where local land use control must not at least be considered.

bit deceiving, however. In some producing states the grant of home rule power is more
limited or requires onerous procedures such that few if any counties have taken advantage
of home rule. For example, Colorado has granted counties home rule authority, see Colorado County Home Rule Powers Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-35-101 to -906, but only two
counties, Pitkin County and Weld County, have adopted home rule charters (in addition to
Denver and Broomfield, which are unique as both cities and counties). Apparently, Adams
County is considering the adoption of a charter. See Yesenia Robles, "Adams County considers home-rule charter to govern county;' Denver Post (Feb. 17, 2014). New Mexico allows
the home rule incorporation of a county that "at the time of the adoption of this amendment, ... is less than one hundred forty-four square miles in area and has a population of
ten thousand or more ... :· N.M. Const. art. X, § 5. Los Alamos County is the only county
that qualified under the size and population restrictions. In Oklahoma, counties with a
population of less than 550,000 that contain a city with a population of 250,000 or more
may adopt a county home rule charter, see Okla. Stat. tit. 19, § 8.2, but to date, no Oklahoma
county has adopted such a charter. See Ballotpedia, supra.
140 The

Colorado legislature has expressly conferred on non-home rule counties the
power to protect "health, safety, and welfare;' Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-11-101(2), and zoning
and land use power. See Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act of 1974, id.
§§ 29-20-101 to -306. See also id.§§ 30-28-101 to -139.
In New Mexico, counties have the same powers as non-home rule municipalities,
expressly including the "powers necessary and proper to provide for the safety, preserve the
health, promote the prosperity and improve the morals, order, comfort and convenience
of any county or its inhabitants:' N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 4-37-1. New Mexico counties also have
been expressly granted zoning authority. Id.§ 3-21-1.
141
See Okla. Stat. tit. 19, § 1 (general powers of county, with no mention of health, safety,
welfare, morals, etc.); id. § 865.51 (planning authority for all counties); id. § 868.11 (zoning
authority for counties with a population of 500,000 or more in furtherance of health, safety,
welfare, morals, etc.).
142 See Tex.

Loe. Gov't Code Ann.§ 231.001 (providing limited power to counties to zone
in specific places around certain lakes, historical areas, military areas, and recreation areas,
but not general roning authority).
143 See

Kramer: Local Land Use Regulation, supra note 1, at 5-2, 5-3.
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[2] Challenges to Local Oil and Gas Regulation
Despite grants of home rule and other powers to sub-state units, all such
grants of power are subject to boundaries. Local government regulation of
oil and gas may be challenged on a number of grounds, including (1) preemption; (2) regulatory takings claims; (3) substantive due process; and
(4) for "community rights" ordinances, section 1983 constitutional claims.
Plaintiffs owning undeveloped minerals may also allege the violation of
"vested rights" if the plaintiff already has received a drilling permit or filed
an application for a drilling permit, depending on the jurisdiction.144 This
section intentionally provides only an introduction to these issues and is
meant to familiarize the reader with certain types of challenges that might
be brought against sub-state ordinances.

[a] Preemption
Most cases challenging the ability of sub-state units to regulate oil and
gas operations or well location now involve claims of preemption. Preemption "establishes a priority between potentially conflicting laws enacted by
various levels of government:' 145 Whether the sub-state unit is a home-rule
unit or a general law statutory unit is a threshold question, as the preemption analysis differs.

[i]

Home Rule Threshold Questions

If the sub-state unit is a home rule unit, the type of home rule as either
imperio or legislative also affects the analysis. In Colorado, an imperio
home rule state, whether the disputed matter is of local, state, or mixed

144

"Vested rights" is a legal defense against the deprivation of private property with
Fourteenth Amendment underpinnings based on the concept that at some point in the zoning process real property rights acquired by an owner cannot be taken away by regulation.
See David G. Heeter, "Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel
and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes:' 1971 Urb. L. Ann. 63, 65 & n.3 (1971). See generally
Karen L. Crocker, Note, "Vested Rights and Zoning: Avoiding All-or-Nothing Results;' 43
B.C. L. Rev. 935 (2002). The majority rule adopted in at least 30 states requires both a building permit and substantial expenditures or commitments before the time the sub-state unit
changes its zoning law. See John J. Delaney, "Vesting Verities and the Development Chronology: A Gaping Disconnect?" 3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 603, 607, 615 (2000). Minority rules
come in a number of variations, such as the more liberal "early vesting" rules adopted by
statute in Colorado and Texas. See Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 24-68-103 (vested right "deemed established ... upon the approval, or conditional approval, of a site specific development plan,
following notice and public hearing"); Tex. Loe. Gov't Code Ann.§ 245.002(a) (application
for permit must be considered solely based on the regulations and ordinances in effect at
the time "the original application for permit is filed for review"); Cont'l Homes of Tex., L.P.
v. City of San Antonio, 275 S.W.3d 9, 21 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008) (explaining Texas's
vested rights statute).
145 Huntley &

Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 862 (Pa. 2009).

§

11.03[2] [a] [i]

LOCAL CONTROL OVER 0IL AND GAS

11-27

state-local concern determines whether state or local legislation controls.146 In matters of local concern, the home rule ordinance will prevail
over conflicting state statutes. In matters of statewide concern, home rule
units are completely without power to act, absent explicit authorization
in the state constitution or from the legislature. For these matters, local
law is preempted. Mixed state-local matters concern both home rule units
and the state. These matters may be regulated by both the home rule ordinance and the state statute, but only to the extent they do not conflict. 147
Accordingly, once the court determines that a matter is of mixed state-local
concern, the court will then turn to its conflict analysis.
Unfortunately, there is no specific test to determine whether a matter is
of local, state, or mixed concern. Instead, the court decides based on an
ad hoc consideration of the totality of the circumstances. 148 Factors considered include "the need for statewide uniformity, whether the municipal legislation has an extraterritorial impact, whether the subject matter
is traditionally one governed by state or local government, and whether
the [state] [c] onstitution specifically identifies that the issue should be
regulated by state or local legislation:'149 A court may also consider other
factors such as the need for cooperation between state and local governments and any legislative declaration as to whether the matter is of statewide concern. 150 While matters relating to the structure and organization
of government overwhelmingly are held to be matters of local concern, 151
"[t]here exists a doubtful or twilight zone separating those matters that are
clearly of municipal concern from those that are not:'152
In legislative home rule states, the court looks to both the text of the
constitutional or statutory provision granting home rule powers and the
applicable legislative enactments to resolve preemption questions. In some
states, the state constitution provides legislative home rule units with the

146Boulder Cnty. Apt. Ass'n v. City of Boulder, 97 P.3d 322,336 (Colo. App. 2004). See
also Laurie Reynolds, "Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region:' 86 Denv. U L.
Rev. 1271, 1276

(2009).

147 Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992).
148See City of Northglenn v. lbarra, 62 P.3d 151, 155 (Colo. 2003).
149Jd. at 156. See also Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LLC, 3 P.3d 30, 37
(Colo. 2000).
15°City of Northglenn,

l5l See Sandra M.

62 P.3d at 156; Town of Telluride, 3 P.3d at 37.

Stevenson, Antieau on Local Government Law§ 22.06 (2d ed. 2014).

152Helmer v. Superior Court, 191 P. 1001, 1003 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920).
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"maximum [power of] local self-government;'153 but that power is not
unlimited. The grant of home rule power may also provide that the home
rule unit may not exercise legislative powers or perform functions that are
denied by a "general law:' 154 In that case, the court must first determine
whether the potentially conflicting state law is a general law. 155
A "general law" may be described as a law that affects most or many of
the inhabitants of the state and operates uniformly throughout the state. 156
Some courts may also require that a general law actually prescribe regulations that address the disputed matter, rather than simply purport to limit
the local power to regulate. In Ohio, for example, a law is a general law
for purposes of home-rule analysis if it ( 1) is part of statewide legislation;
(2) applies to all parts of the state uniformly; (3) actually contains police,
sanitary, or similar regulations (rather than just purporting to limit local
power); and (4) prescribes a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. 157 In
states that examine the general law question, limits on local control that are
not general laws are unconstitutional attempts to limit legislative homerule powers. 158

[ii] The Preemption Conflict Analysis
When the local law at issue concerns a general law sub-state unit (such
as a non-home rule municipality, county, or other general law unit), courts
need not answer the home-rule threshold questions, but may proceed in
their preemption analysis directly to the question whether local law and
state law conflict. In a legislative home rule state, once state law is found
to be a general law (or in an imperio home rule state, once the law is found
to be of mixed state-local concern), most courts then apply the same or

153N.M.

Const. art. X,

§

6(E).

l5 4 Jd. §

6(D). The Ohio Constitution expressly confers upon home rule municipalities
the authority to exercise the power oflocal self-government. See Ohio Const. art. XVIII,§ 3.
While the Ohio legislature may not preempt this power, it is limited to matters that relate
solely to the government and administration of the internal affairs of the municipality. See
Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 896 N.E.2d 967 (Ohio 2008).
155 Apodaca

v. Wilson, 525 P.2d 876, 882 (N.M. 1974).

156 See City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio 2002) (setting forth a four-part test

for a general law, including whether the statute applies uniformly throughout the state);
State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 845 P.2d 150, 156 (N.M. 1992) (test is whether the law affects
all, most, or many of the inhabitants of the state or only the inhabitants of the municipality).
157 State ex. rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 989 N.E.2d 85, 93 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013)
(citing Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 968).

15BCanton, 766 N.E.2d at 96.
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a similar preemption analysis applied to statutory general law subs-state
units such as non-home rule municipalities, counties, and other non-home
rule sub-state units.1s9
Any of three tests may be applied to find preemption. 160 Local law is preempted if ( 1) the language of the statute expressly preempts local authority
on the subject matter (express preemption), (2) the court determines that
the state legislature intended to preempt local authority by completely occupying the field (implied field preemption), or (3) the court finds a conflict
between the state law and the local law (implied conflict preemption). 1 6 1
Where the language of a statute purports to preempt local authority
or to grant exclusive authority to a state agency, courts should ask the
express preemption question as a matter of statutory construction before
ever applying either of the implied conflict tests. 162 If the language does
expressly preempt local authority, a court should ascertain the scope of the
preemption.
Only if the language of the state statute allows for sub-state regulation
should the court then ask whether the local regulation impliedly conflicts
with the state regulatory scheme. As to implied conflict preemption, it is
often said that a conflict arises when a local ordinance prohibits what a

159 See,

e.g., Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 133 P.3d 866 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (applying "general law" preemption test applicable to counties from San Pedro Mining Corp. v. Board of
County Commissioners of Santa Fe County, 909 P.2d 754 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), rather than
a separate "home rule" test), aff'd, 171 P.3d 300 (N.M. 2007).
160 This three-part analysis mirrors the

analysis applied to determine whether federal law
preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2:
[Federal] [p]re-emption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute,
expresses a clear intent to pre-empt state law, when there is outright or actual
conflict between federal and state law, where compliance with both federal and
state law is in effect physically impossible, where there is implicit in federal law
a barrier to state regulation, were Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus
occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to
supplement federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress.
La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986) (citations omitted).
161 Bd.

ofCnty. Comm'rs, La Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., Inc., 830 P.2d 1045,
1056-57 (Colo. 1992) (en bane).
162 See Town of Milliken v.

Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Onshore LP, 2013 COA 72," 3 (applying express preemption analysis to a provision of Colorado law that prohibits a local government from charging "a tax or fee to conduct inspections or monitoring of oil and gas
operations" ( quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-106(15)) ).
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state statute or regulation allows or vice versa, 163 or because the local ordinance frustrates the purpose of a particular state law. 164 This formulation,
however, is not as simple as first appears. An operator may have a state
issued permit to drill in a particular location, but in many cases, courts
allow sub-state units to prohibit drilling in the very location authorized by
the permit. 165
Also consider that a court may find that an agency that has promulgated
rules or regulations under the disputed state statute is entitled to deference
in interpreting its own enabling legislation. 166 For that reason, an agency's
involvement in preemption litigation in defense of its authority might
influence the outcome. Further, courts may examine with more scrutiny
zoning ordinances that ban certain land use activities instead of delineating appropriate districts or zones for those uses or activities. 16 7

[b] Regulatory Takings
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation:' 168 Since
1897, the "takings" prohibition has applied to the states and their sub-state
units by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 169 A
local ordinance that is not preempted nevertheless may effectuate a taking.
That said, not all local regulations, even those that ban an activity outright,
constitute takings. Once a taking is found, however, the owner is entitled
to "just compensation'' based on the fair market value of the property

l630hioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 896 N.E.2d 967 (Ohio 2008);
Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 862 (Pa. 2009); Colo. Mining
Ass'n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 199 P.3d 718, 725 (Colo. 2009).
164 See

Keith B. Hall, "When Do State Oil and Gas or Mining Statutes Preempt Local
Regulations?" 27 Nat. Resources & Env't 16 (2013).
165See Kramer, Governmental Relations,

supra note 1, at 108, 109.

166 See, e.g., Colo. Mining Ass'n, 199 P.3d at 726, 731. But see Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v.
COGCC, 81 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Colo. App. 2003) (providing no deference and invalidating
COGCC rule that a permit-to-drill is binding as to a conflicting sub-state unit approval
process as inconsistent with judicially created operational conflicts test).

167 See

Colo. Mining Ass'n, 199 P.3d at 730.

16Bu.s.

Const. amend. V. While the taking of private property for public use requires just
compensation, the taking of private property for the purpose of conferring a private benefit
is absolutely prohibited. See Keio v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005).
1 69See

Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241 (1897).

§

I1.03[2][b]

LOCAL CONTROL OVER 0IL AND GAS

11-31

taken. 170 If the state rescinds the regulation after it is found to work a taking, the government may compensate the claimant for the period the taking was effective. 111
A direct appropriation of property clearly is a taking. 172 In contrast,
"regulatory takings" claims (also referred to as inverse condemnation
actions) 173 are those based on regulations or land use restrictions enacted
by governments under the zoning or police power. The only certain rule
in regulatory takings jurisprudence is that a permanent physical invasion
by or upon the authority of the government is a taking, no matter how
small or insignificant the invasion or the weight of the public purpose. 174
Most sub-state regulation of oil and gas, however, involves neither a direct
appropriation nor a physical invasion.
All exercises of the police power, whether by zoning or direct regulation,
"take" some rights in the bundle of sticks, but not all exercises of the police
power constitute a taking in the constitutional sense. 175 In Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 176 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, gave life to
modern regulatory takings jurisprudence, stating that "while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking:' 177 Only four years after the Pennsylvania Coal decision,
the Supreme Court established the permissibility of zoning in Euclid, 178
and then two years later struck down a zoning ordinance on due process

170See

United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 n.l (1984) ("what a willing
buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller" (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,
374 {1943))).
171 First

English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321-22

(1987).
172 See Gibson

v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897). A direct appropriation of property is
usually an action for eminent domain brought by or on behalf of the government.
173 An

"inverse condemnation" action is "[a]n action brought by a property owner for

compensation from a governmental" entity that has taken the owner's property without

bringing formal condemnation proceedings:· Black's Law Dictionary 310 (8th ed. 2004).
174 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-40 {1982)
(finding a taking by physical invasion).
175 See

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("[A]s long recognized some
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power:').
176 260

177 Jd.

U.S. 393 (1922).

at 415 (emphasis added).

178 272

U.S. 365 {1926).
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grounds in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 179 without even a reference to
Pennsylvania Coal. 180 Between those cases and the Supreme Court's next
takings decision 46 years later, 181 the Court tacitly allowed state judiciaries
to erode regulatory takings jurisprudence.
Since it reemerged in 1974, the Supreme Court has spun a complex web
of jurisprudence in its attempt to define when regulation goes too far, 1s2
distinguishing but not expressly overruling Pennsylvania Coal along the
way. 183 In an effort to assuage private property rights advocates, some
states have enacted "takings" statutes, but these statutes offer little relief in
the context of local oil and gas regulation. 184 Accordingly, most litigants
must rely on the morass of judicial precedent.

179 277

U.S. 183 (1928).

180 In

Nectow, the court substituted its judgment for that of the City Council to find that
a rezoning of plaintiff's property from industrial to residential use did not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Id. at 188. The court
was influenced by the fact that immediately adjoining lands were devoted to industrial and
railroad purposes. Id. at 187.
181 See

Viii. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).

182 Takings

jurisprudence routinely is described as in a state of disarray. See, e.g., David
L. Callies, "Regulatory Takings and The Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property
Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are
Doing About n:' 28 Stetson L. Rev. 523, 523 (1999); John A. Rumbach, "Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause;' 18 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 {1993); James A. Kushner,
"Property and Mysticism: The Legality of Exactions as a Condition for Public Development
Approval in the Time of the Rehnquist Court:' 8 /. Land Use & Envtl. L. 53 (1992); Jan G.
Laitos, "Takings and Causation:' 5 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. /. 359 {1997); Richard J. Lazarus,
"Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme Court's Takings Cases:' 38 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 1099 (1997); Richard J. Lazarus, "Putting the Correct 'Spin' on Lucas:' 45
Stan. L. Rev. 1411 (1993).
183 See

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
184 These

statutes do not replace constitutional takings, but add procedures that states
must follow to assess potential takings or provide additional statutory claims. Approximately 17 states have takings "assessment" statutes that require agencies to assess whether
their actions constitute a taking, including Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Lynda J. Oswald, "Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power:' 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 527, 542 n.61, 542-43 (2000) (citing Harvey M.
Jacobs, State Property Rights Laws: The Impacts of Those Laws on My Land 7 (1999)). Only
four states, including Texas and Louisiana, have state statutes that require compensation for
a specific loss in value, id. at 544-45, but the Texas and Louisiana statutes foreclose remedies for most sub-state actions that regulate oil and gas. The Louisiana statute only applies
to "takings" of agricultural property, see La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:3602, and the Texas statute
excludes most municipal actions, county actions taken before September l, 1997, and various other actions from its coverage, see Tex. Gov't Code Ann.§ 2007.003(b)(3), (13), (d).
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The Takings Analysis
The regulatory takings analysis begins with two categorical rules. First,
since the 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 185 a
taking will be found if the disputed regulation causes a complete loss of
economically beneficial or productive use. 186 This is an all-or-nothing
rule. Under this categorical rule, "in at least some cases the landowner with
95% loss will get nothing, while the landowner with a total loss will recover
in full:' 187 As will be discussed below, the denominator in this calculation
becomes critically important. 188
Under another categorical rule, an exercise of the police power (including the zoning power) that regulates a "nuisance" is not a taking, even if the
regulation causes a complete loss. 189 Since the Lucas decision, the applicable legislature (e.g., city council, county commission), may not simply
declare that a particular activity is a nuisance by citing potential adverse
effects on safety, health, or welfare. 190 Instead, the offending activity must
already be prohibited under the state's "background principles" of common
law property and nuisance law. As a result of this formulation, judges, not
legislatures, determine what is or is not a nuisance for takings .purposes. 191
The Colorado case of Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer192 illustrates the
application of the categorical nuisance exception. In Aztec, the State

1ss505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

186Id. at 1016. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia traces the categorical rule to Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), a disingenuous citation because Agins cited
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978), for the
proposition that the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation "denies an
owner economically viable use of his land:' Penn Central did not establish a categorical rule.
187505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.

188See§ ll.03[2][b][ii], infra.
189 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law upheld prohibiting manufacture of
alcoholic beverages); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (law upheld that barred
operation of brick mill in residential area).
l90"Since such a justification [by the legislature] can be formulated in practically every
case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.' Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1025 n.12.

191 The reference of the court to "common law" and "background principles" implies that
old common law made by long-dead judges determines what constitutes a "nuisance" under
Justice Scalia's test announced in Lucas. In dissent, Justice Blackmun argues that twentieth
century judges, and even legislatures, are just as capable of distinguishing harms from benefits, and that nuisance law is a mess. Id. at 1054-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
192940 P.2d 1025 (Colo. App. 1996).
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condemned a mine after the owner's cyanide leaching operation contaminated a nearby creek and settling ponds on the site. The court stated that
" [a] landowner cannot reasonably expect to put property to a use that
constitutes a nuisance, even if that is the only economically viable use for
the property.... Such uses were never part of the landowner's 'bundle of
• h ts ....'"193
ng
Whether oil and gas development constitutes a "nuisance" is generally
beyond the scope of this chapter, but a concise formulation was set out in
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Vandergriff. 194 There the court held that drilling
an oil and gas well is not a nuisance per se, but that if property is substantially damaged as a result of the drilling, the surface owner may recover
for a nuisance in fact. 195 Because the finding of a nuisance is a fact-based,
case-by-case inquiry, courts should have difficulty relying on the categorical nuisance exception to allow a sub-state unit to avoid a takings claim in
connection with an outright ban on all oil and gas activity. 196
Assuming the regulation causes less than a complete loss of beneficial
use and the categorical nuisance exception does not apply, the court may
find a partial regulatory taking applying the balancing test announced
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. 197 Under Penn
Central, a court conducts an essentially ad hoc, factual inquiry that balances (1) "the character of the governmental action;' (2) "[t]he economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant;' and (3) "the extent to which the
regulation ... interfered with [the claimant's] distinct investment-backed
expectations:' 198
As to the first prong, the character of the governmental action, at one
time the Court asked whether the government regulation was appropriate

193 Jd.

at 1031-32 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).

194122

P.2d 1020 (Okla. 1942).

195 C.f Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Smith, 290 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (nuisance
found for voluntary and intentional operation of burning pit that damaged crops by smoke,
gas, and fumes).

196 In

a case being hailed as a victory against fracking, a Dallas jury recently awarded
almost $3 million in damages to a Texas family, in Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., No. CC11-01650-E (Cnty. Ct. atLawNo. 5, Dallas Cnty., Tex. Apr. 22, 2014), finding that an operator's oil and gas activity constituted a private nuisance. See Jenny Deam, "Jury awards Texas
family nearly $3 million in fracking case:' L.A. Times (Apr. 23, 2014).
191438 U.S. 104 (1978).
198 Id.

at 124.
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to accomplish its purpose,199 but the Court recently disavowed this logical
test. 200 Although this prong appears to be the least important,201 in most
cases involving oil and gas regulation, it likely will favor not finding a taking. All that can be said about the prong is that a taking is more likely when
the action tends toward a physical invasion, and less likely when the action
"arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good:,202 While a court may question a sub-state unit's declaration of a nuisance, it is less likely to question
the character of its regulation.
As to the second prong, the economic impact, the court compares the
market value of the affected property immediately before the governmental action to the market value immediately after the action. 203 This test may
devolve into a battle of experts. 204 Although the larger the loss the more
likely a taking, a large diminution in value alone will not ordinarily support
a Penn Central claim. 205 Supreme Court precedent "ha[s] long established
that mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking:' 2 06
The third prong of the Penn Central test has been the most scrutinized
and least understood. The concept of an investment-backed expectation
implies that the owner reasonably believed he could develop his property
as he intended. Is a purchaser, a successive lessee, or other title holder then

199Jd.

at 129. In Penn Central, the claimant did not dispute that the building restriction
was not appropriate to preserve the historical and cultural significance of Grand Central
Terminal, the landmark at issue in the case. Id.
200 See

note 259, infra, and accompanying text.

2 0 1 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005) ("Primary among
those factors are '[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations:" (alteration in original) (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124)).
202 Penn

Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. Accord, MHC Fin. Ltd. P'ship v. City of San Rafael, 714
F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2013).
203 Keystone

Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497 (1987).

204 see,

e.g., Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States (Cane V), 71 Fed. Cl. 432 (2005) (discussing
at length expert testimony as to value of timber and coal interests), aff'd per curiam, 214 F.
App'x 978 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (mem.).
205 For examples of cases where large diminutions in value were not takings, see Concrete
Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602,645 (1993) (75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 405 (1915) (92.5% diminution); MHC Financing, 714 F.3d at 1127 (81 % diminution).
206 Concrete

Pipe & Prods., 508 U.S. at 645.
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deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and thus barred
from claiming a taking? In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 207 a case involving
a regulation adopted to preserve coastal wetlands, a close 5-4 Supreme
Court found no such categorical rule. 208 Practically, however, Palazzolo
limits most claims by subsequent title holders of property that is already
subject to pre-acquisition regulation. In Palazzolo, four justices dissented,
and a fifth, Justice O'Connor, argued in concurrence that, while not dispositive, acquisition of the property after the enactment of the ordinance
certainly informs the degree to which investment-backed expectations
were frustrated. 209
Even if the sub-state unit enacts its drilling prohibition after the oil and
gas interest is acquired, the interest owner still may lack reasonable expectations that it can produce its minerals, at least for constitutional purposes.
In Mid Gulf, Inc. v. Bishop, 210 the city enacted tough new drilling regulations after an oil and gas lessee applied for a conditional use permit to drill.
To the court, the plaintiff "was fully aware when it obtained the leasehold
interest that the City could regulate drilling in accordance with its police
powers ... :' 211 Under this "anything is possible" standard, no investmentbacked expectation may be considered reasonable.
Also note that most takings claims that challenge regulations (including
zoning and permitting requirements) are not ripe in federal court until
the claimant has ( 1) followed the procedure mandated by the government
agency charged with making the final decision (and the agency has made
a final decision); and (2) sought compensation through whatever other
procedures the state has required, unless such procedures are "unavailable
or inadequate:'212 In part for this reason, a complex ordinance such as the
Santa Fe County ordinance is more difficult to challenge under takings
jurisprudence than an outright ban. The Supreme Court did state in Palazzolo that "[g]overnment authorities, of course, may not burden property
by imposition of repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in order to avoid

207 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
208 Id. at 627 ("The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean

bundle.").
209 Id. at 632-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
21 0792 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Kan. 1992).
2111d. at 1214 (emphasis added).
212 Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197 ( 1985).
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a final decision:' 213 Such a statement implies that at some point a rolling
moratorium or even an especially onerous zoning ordinance may "go
too far:'

[ii] The Conceptual Severance Problem
Takings claims in the mineral context may involve a special problem
referred to as "conceptual severance:' To comprehend this problem requires
an understanding of state property law, because the Supreme Court resorts
to state law to define the range of interests that qualify for protection as
"property" under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 214 Although
in various states a mineral interest in oil and gas may either be described
as "owned in place'' or an "exclusive right to take;' the distinction should
make little difference. 215 Irrespective of the classification, an interest in oil
and gas is an interest in land.216 The same can be said of an oil and gas
lease. The lease "[has] been classified as realty, personalty, chattel real; as
corporeal or incorporeal; as fees, profits, or licenses, depending upon the
purpose for which the classification is made ... :'217 Regardless, an oil and
gas lease is an interest in land. 21 s
Consider, however, the distinction between the owner of "fee" land
(meaning in oil and gas terms, the owner of both the surface estate and the
mineral interest) and the owner of the severed mineral interest or lease.
Property can be divided into all sorts of segments, and has been for takings
purposes. Property may be viewed temporally in the sense that an estate

213 Palazzolo,

533 U.S. at 621 (citing Montereyv. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526
U.S. 687, 698 (1999)). In Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston, 243 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, review denied), the city that denied a drilling permit to the
plaintiff contended that plaintiff had not exhausted its administrative remedies because
it did not appeal to the City Council the decision of the Director of Public Works. The
court agreed with the plaintiff, holding that the final decision requirement is different than
exhaustion of remedies. The Director of Public Works was the relevant decision maker
and the ordinance did not provide for an appeal process; thus, an appeal would have been
futile. Id. at 719-20. Twenty years after the plaintiff's attempt to drill a natural gas well near
Houston (and two trial courts, three trials, and four appeals), it ultimately prevailed on its
inverse condemnation claim. See City of Houston v. Maguire Oil Co., 342 S.W.3d 726 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, review denied).
214 See

Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011-13 (1984).
215 1 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law§ 211
{2013).
216 Jd. §

212; 1 Eugene 0. Kuntz,A Treatise on the Law ofOil and Gas§ 2.2 (rev. ed. 2013).

217Kuntz, supra note 216, at§ 18.2.
218Jd.
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for a term of years has a shorter duration than a fee simple absolute. It may
be viewed spatially on the horizontal access, such that a five-acre tract is
smaller than a ten-acre tract. It also may be viewed spatially on the vertical
axis based on the ad coelum doctrine,2 19 such that a mineral interest is less
than a "fee» interest in both the surface and minerals. 220
Return to Pennsylvania Coal, the case that kicked off modern takings
jurisprudence. There, the plaintiff coal company conveyed the surface, but
retained the right to remove the coal (i.e., the subjacent support). Writing
for the majority, Justice Holmes found a taking in part based on the recognition by Pennsylvania of subjacent support as a separate estate.221 The
plaintiff lost this estate when the legislature enacted the Kohler Act, which
required the coal estate owner to prevent subsidence by leaving coal pillars
in place.222 In dissent, Justice Brandeis disagreed. He argued that when
measuring the loss, the Court should have considered the entire property
interest, including the surface, the coal estate, and the support estate. 223 In
other words, Justice Holmes viewed the estates separately (the disaggregate
approach), while Justice Brandeis viewed the estates in the aggregate (the
aggregate approach).
In addition to "conceptual severance;' this issue has been referred to as
the "denominator» problem. 224 In Lucas, Scalia highlighted the problem in
dicta, when he stated that "this uncertainty regarding the composition of
the denominator in our 'deprivation, fraction has produced inconsistent
pronouncements by the Courf,225 As discussed above, a Lucas categorical
taking requires a loss of all economically beneficial use. If the denominator
is aggregated to include the surface estate, an owner of a fee interest suffers
only a partial loss upon the enactment of a ban on oil and gas production.
If the denominator includes only the particular estate (the disaggregate
approach), then a ban may result in a categorical taking.
219 Cuius

est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos ("To whomsoever the soil
belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths:'). See 1 Coke on Littleton§ 1(4) (1628).
220 For comprehensive treatment of the different ways in which property may be either
aggregated or disaggregated, see Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings§ 7-7 (5th ed. 2013).
221 Pa.

Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,414 (1922).

222 Id.

at 412-13.

223 Id.

at 419.

224See

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (critical question is determination of the denominator).
225 Lucas v.

S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). Scalia then sidestepped
the problem by turning to the state trial court finding (without exposition) that the plaintiff's entire "fee simple" interest was lost. Id.
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Although Justice Holmes won the battle in 1923, Justice Brandeis appears
to have won the war. Since Penn Central was decided, the Supreme Court
consistently aggregates separate estates to avoid a taking. In Penn Central,
a historic preservation regulation caused the plaintiff to lose the airspace
rights to build upward on top of Grand Central Terminal, but the plaintiff
continued to own and operate the terminal. The Court stated: "'Taking'
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated:'226 The aggregation of separate estates thus implicates
not only the Lucas complete loss categorical rule but also the economic loss
and investment-backed expectations prongs that are balanced under Penn
Central when the complete loss categorical rule is inapplicable.
In an even bigger blow to the Justice Holmes disaggregation approach,
the Supreme Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 227
decided 65 years after Pennsylvania Coal, repudiated entirely the notion
that the support estate should be considered separately from the coal
estate. Keystone involved a facial challenge to the Pennsylvania Subsidence
Act, which, like the Kohler Act considered in Pennsylvania Coal, targeted
subsidence in coal development. As in Pennsylvania Coal, the petitioners
argued a taking of the coal that was required to be left in place, but in
complete contrast to Pennsylvania Coal, the Court relied on Penn Central
to aggregate the coal estate with the support estate, finding plenty of coal
left to be mined. 228
Although there is a paucity of case law as to the conceptual severance
of oil and gas specifically, holdings that have considered mineral interests,
including the few oil and gas cases, imply courts will aggregate whatever vertical, horizontal, or durational interests that may be owned by

226
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). Penn Central
was an as-applied challenge. The plaintiff in this case was denied the right to build a modern skyscraper on top of the terminal. The Court states that even all of the airspace rights
were not lost because the plaintiff could have applied for a more reasonable addition. Id. at
136-37. Further, the court found that the issuance to plaintiff of transferable development
rights (TDR) mitigated the plaintiff's loss of a reasonable return on its investment. Id. at
137. A TDR allows the holder to develop another parcel (i.e., other than the parcel where
development is denied) in a manner that would not otherwise be allowed. See Eagle, supra
note 220, at § 4-4. Professor Eagle posits that TDRs may be granted either out of fairness
considerations or to buy the government's way out of a takings claim. Id. The Santa Fe
County Ordinance provides for TDRs as a rather unveiled tool to accomplish the latter. See
Santa Fe Ordinance, supra note 60, and accompanying text.
227 480
228 Id.

U.S. 470 (1987).

at 500-01.
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the claimant to avoid finding a taking. In Mid Gulf, Inc. v. Bishop, 229 for
example, the court found the loss of plaintiff's oil and gas leasehold interest
was not sufficient to constitute a taking because the plaintiff also owned
valuable interests in the surface. 230 In Eastern Minerals International v.
United States, 231 a fascinating and tangled case, the court awarded takings
compensation to nonparticipating royalty owners and a coal lessee after
the U.S. Department of the Interior declared the area unsuitable for mining. 232 On appeal, however, the court of appeals reversed as to the coal lessee because its lease expired and was not renewed before the government
foreclosed mining. 233 The court highlighted the rule that a normal delay,
such as a permitting delay, will not constitute a taking. Even an extraordinary delay, including a moratorium, will not provide the basis for a taking
absent a showing of bad faith. 2 3 4
In a separate action related to Eastern Minerals, the court concluded
the "relevant parcel" of the mineral interest lessor included not only the
coal mineral interest but also the surface. 235 On appeal, the court even
aggregated multiple non-contiguous parcels owned by the mineral lessor.
According to the court, separate parcels may be considered a single "relevant parcel" for takings purposes based on whether the developer treats
the parcels as a single economic unit, taking into account such factors as
contiguity, acquisition dates, the extent that the regulated lands enhance
·
the value of the other lands, "and no doubt many others:' 236
Obviously, then, a plaintiff has a better chance of success if it owns a
lease, a severed mineral interest, or a royalty interest dependent entirely
on production for beneficial use, owns no interest in the surface, and owns
no other interests in the area that may be developed or otherwise used in
229792 F. Supp. 1205 (Kan. 1992).
230 Id.

at 1214.

231 39

Fed. Cl. 621 (1997), reva, Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001),

cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1077 (2002).
232Eastern Minerals, 39 Fed. Cl. at 631-32.
2 3 3 Wyatt,

271 F.3d at 1097.

234 Id.

See also Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 334-35 (2002) (development moratorium of 32 months did not constitute a per
se taking).
235 Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 112 (2002), partial summary judgment granted, 57 Fed. Cl. 115, 121 (2003), reh'g granted in part, denied in part, 62 Fed. Cl.

481 (2003).

236 Cane Tenn., 57 Fed. Cl. at 121 (quoting Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310,318
(1991)).
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a beneficial manner. This was made crystal clear in the Michigan case of
Miller Brothers v. Department of Natural Resources,237 where the plaintiff
mineral owner was denied the ability to drill in a restricted area. There,
the court found a taking, stating, "Plaintiff's mineral interests ... had one,
and only one, economically viable use: the extraction of any oil or gas that
might be found under the land:' 238 However, the court also rejected an
argument that directional drilling may have allowed the plaintiff to drill
under the restricted area because at least some oil and gas could not be
extracted using the method. 239 The court thus cast off the usual aggregation approach.
Finally, consider the aggregation of time. In the temporal realm, courts
may examine not only the loss attendant to the regulation but also whether
a profit was made before the effective time of the regulation. For example,
in Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 240 the plaintiff conducted mining operations under federal coal leases in Tennessee. The Department of the Interior suspended the plaintiffs mining permit after it was unable to develop
a satisfactory plan to address acid mine drainage, and the plaintiff alleged
a taking. The court found no categorical complete loss, despite its inability
to mine in the future, because the plaintiff earned a profit from the mining
of coal (over the cost of its lease) before the suspension of its permit. 241
The temporal aspects of takings jurisprudence also played a key role in
City of Houston v. Trail Enterprises, Inc.,242 where the plaintiffs owned mineral interests in a "control area'' around Lake Houston. The City originally
protected the control area in a 1965 ordinance that it amended in 1977 to
exclude areas within the City limits (and to include the City's extraterritorial jurisdiction). The City amended the ordinance again in 1997 to include
both areas. 243 The court found no taking in a sententious application of the
Penn Central factors. Specifically, plaintiffs' relevant investments afforded
no reasonable expectation of recovery because they were made after new
drilling was prohibited. Otherwise, "a person could entitle him or herself
to compensation by obtaining a mineral interest in any property, even

237513
238 Id.

N.W.2d 217 (Mich. App. 1994).

at 220.

239Id.

240247 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
241 Id.

at 1363.

242 377

243 Id.

S.W.3d 873 (Tex App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, review denied).

at 876-77.
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for a nominal sum, where extraction of the minerals was prohibited:' 244
Although the plaintiffs failed to adequately argue that they were denied all
economically beneficial or productive use of their mineral interests, the
court in dicta asserted such a claim also would fail because the plaintiffs
had and would continue to receive their share of production from existing
wells that predated the 1997 amendment. 245 In contrast, in City of Houston v. Maguire Oil Co., 246 the same court affirmed a taking in a drawn-out
case involving the same ordinance involved in Trail Enterprises. In that
case, however, the City did not dispute the trial court's finding that the
City caused a taking of the plaintiff's mineral interest. 247 Instead, the City
relied on its assertion that the plaintiff actually had the right to drill, and its
employees were unauthorized to wrongfully deny that right. Even though
the ordinance never actually applied to the drill site, the court held that
the erroneous enforcement of the ordinance was sufficient to constitute a
taking.24s

[c] Other Claims

[i]

Substantive Due Process

In addition to the Takings Clause, the Fifth Amendment contains another
clause pertaining to property. The Due Process Clause provides that " [n] o
person shall ... be deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process
of law:'249 Although the due process test applied to zoning ordinances and
police power regulations has been couched in varying terms, including
reasonableness, the test may be analogized to the "rational basis" standard
applied to legislative enactments where no "suspect factors:' "fundamental rights:' or "heightened scrutiny" is involved. 250 Under a rational basis
analysis, courts uphold legislation that is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. 251
As described earlier, beginning with Euclid, in the early challenges to
zoning ordinances courts analyzed claims in terms of substantive due
process, asking the "fairly debatable" question and whether ordinances
244 Id.

at 883.

245 Id.

at 877.

246 342 S.W.3d 726 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
247 Id.

at 738.

248 Id.

at 747.

2011, review denied).

249 U.S. Const. amend. V.
2 5°See

Kyser v. Kasson Twp., 786 N.W.2d 543, 522 n.2 (Mich. 2010).

251 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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were "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare:' 252 In the earlier
cases, a few challenged local oil and gas ordinances were struck down on
substantive due process grounds when courts applied the type of "hard
look'' applied in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 253 but most were upheld,
even when takings were alleged. 2 54
Confusion as to the overlap between takings and due process jurisprudence arose from the holding in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 255 where the
Supreme Court stated that government regulation of private property
effects a Fifth Amendment taking if the regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests:' 256 In announcing this standard,
the Agins Court cited Nectow, which cited Euclid, both zoning cases that
applied substantive due process standards. 257 Despite the link back to
Euclid, the Court in Agins seemingly raised the bar for the validity of an
ordinance from "arguably debatable" to "substantially advance:'
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 258 the Supreme Court disavowed the
"substantially advance" test as a type of heightened scrutiny due process
standard that has nothing to do with takings jurisprudence. The "substantially advance'' test effectively asked whether the regulation accomplished
its purpose, 259 which the Court found irrelevant for a takings claim. Takings law is concerned with the burden of regulation on property rights, not
the validity of the regulation under due process type standards. 260

252 Vill.

of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). See§ 11.03[1], supra.
See also Kramer: Local Land Use Regulation, supra note 1, at 5-25 to 5-34. Professor Kramer
describes the earlier challenges as the "sausage" approach to constitutional law because the
early cases tended to blend substantive due process, equal protection, and regulatory takings into a single big sausage. Id. at 5-24.
253 277

U.S. 183 (1928). See supra note 137. See also City of N. Muskegon v. Miller, 227
N.W. 743 (Mich. 1929) (second-guessing the City's decision to place plaintiff's land in a
residential district); Kramer: Local Land Use Regulation, supra note l, at 5-4 to 5-5.
254 See, e.g., Beveridge v. Harper & Turner Oil Trust, 35 P.2d 435 (Okla. 1934); Marblehead Land Co. v. City of L.A., 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931);
Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. App. 1966).
255 447

256 Id.

U.S. 255 {1980).

at 260.

257Id.
258 544

U.S. 528 (2005).

259Id.
260 See

id. at 542.
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After Lingle, some courts questioned whether takings jurisprudence
effectively subsumed substantive due process in disputes regarding the
effect of regulations on property rights, 261 ending the era of "sausage"
jurisprudence. 262 Substantive due process in the context oflocal regulation
appears alive, 263 but on life support. More is required to invalidate a regulation under substantive due process than a finding that it failed to substantially advance its purpose. A regulation generally violates substantive due
process only if it is considered arbitrary and irrational. 264 The arbitrary and
irrational standard and the "arguably debatable" standard are high bars for
challenging a local oil and gas ordinance enacted under the police power
or its subsidiary, the zoning power.

[ii]

Section 1983 Constitutional Claims

The basic cause of action for federal court review of alleged sub-state
unit violations of federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 26 5 Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ... :'

Section 1983 is considered in this chapter because community rights
ordinances such as the ordinance adopted in Mora County, New Mexico,
may purport to strip corporations of their rights under the First and Fifth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These community rights ordinances
may also prohibit transportation or infrastructure related to the extraction
of oil and gas, giving rise to dormant Commerce Clause claims, which also
may be brought under section 1983. 266

261See Eagle, supra note 220, at§ 7-14(d)(2).
262 See

supra note 252.

263 See

Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

264 The

Fifth Circuit stated, "[a] zoning decision violates substantive due process only
if there is no 'conceivable rational basis' under which the government might have based
its decision:' Yur-Mar, L.L.C. v. Jefferson Parish Council, 451 F. App'x 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Shelton v. City of Coll. Station, 780 F.2d 475, 477 (5th
Cir. 1986)).
265 See

Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 482-83 (5th ed. 2007).

266 The dormant Commerce Clause creates a right to participate in interstate commerce
without undue interference by individual states, and may be brought under section 1983.
See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991); Chemerinsky, supra note 265, at 570.
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In Monell v. Department ofSocial Services ofN. Y.C.,267 the Supreme Court
cleared the way for section 1983 liability of local governments and their
officials, subject to some exceptions that were later developed. In Monell,
the Supreme Court overruled its own decision in Monroe v. Pape, 268 which
held that local governments were wholly immune from suit under section 1983. Section 1983 now applies to actions by legislative bodies such
as county commissions and city councils. 269 It also applies to actions of
agencies exercising delegated authority such as municipal zoning boards
and boards of adjustment. 270 Local governments are not entitled to governmental immunity from section 1983 liability, even when they act in good
faith. 271 In contrast, local legislators themselves have absolute immunity
for legislative tasks. 212
§ 11.04 Trends in Preemption Jurisprudence

[1] Avoiding Preemption by Narrow Construction of
Legislative Intent to Preempt
As illustrated above, the recent increase in drilling activity prompted
by industry technological advances has been accompanied by more local
bans and restrictions on drilling activities to appease residents and interest
groups. More bans and restrictions have led to more legal claims that state
law preempts local law and more judicial opinions deciding such cases.
These decisions show that in the absence of clear legislative directives,
courts are straining to uphold sub-state bans and drilling restrictions.
In the case of express preemption, courts may construe supposed legislative purposes of statutes rather than the statutory text itself to arrive at
what the courts believe to be the appropriate outcome. 273 Where implied
field preemption is at issue, courts may define the field as narrowly as possible to allow concurrent jurisdiction. Where implied conflicts between
state and local laws are considered, courts may limit conflicts to only those
technical operational matters that the applicable state conservation agency
clearly regulates.
267 436

U.S. 658 (1978).

268365

U.S. 167 (1961).

269 Pembaur v.

City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,480 (1986).

2 7 oSee

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

271 See

Owen v. City oflndependence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).

272See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998).
273 Scalia and Garner refer to this practice as purposivism, with a "destructive (and most
alluring) feature of ... manipulability:' Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 18 (2012).
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[a] Express Preemption Is Not Express
Preemption in New York
In Matter of Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 274 the New York Court of
Appeals (New York's highest court) consolidated the cases of Norse Energy
Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden 275 and Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of
Middlefield276 and decided, in a 5-2 decision, that an express state statute
clearly preempting the regulation of oil and gas does not preempt an outright ban or other land use regulation, thus affirming the decisions of the
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, in both cases. Both the
Town of Dryden and the Town of Middlefield had enacted a zoning ordinance that completely banned activities related to the exploration, production, or storage of natural gas and petroleum. 277 At issue was whether the
following provision of the Oil, Gas and Solution Mining Law (OGSML) 278
preempted the bans: "The provisions of this article shall supersede all local
laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution
mining industries; but shall not supersede local government jurisdiction
over local roads or the rights oflocal governments under the real property
tax law:' 279
The court began its analysis by reviewing the home rule provision of the
New York Constitution, New York's Municipal Home Rule Law (MHRL),
and New York's Town Law. The MHRL empowers sub-state units to protect
and enhance their physical and visual environment, and the order, conduct, safety, and health and well-being of its citizens. 280 The Town Law,
New York's version of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, grants zoning
power to sub-state units and recognizes land use as "[a]mong the most
important powers and duties granted ... to a town government:'281
The court then turns to its reasoning in Frew Run Gravel Products, Inc.
v. Town of Carroll, 282 which provides the court's analytical framework
for examining whether a supersession clause expressly preempts a local
274 23 N.Y.3d 728, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014).
2 7 5964

N.Y.S.2d 714 (App. Div. 2013).

27 6964

N.Y.S.2d 431 (App. Div. 2013).

277 Wallach,

23 N.Y.3d at 739.

27 sN.Y.

Envtl. Conserv. Law§§ 23-0301 to -0313.

279 Id. §

23-0303(2).

280Wallach,

23 N.Y.3d at 742 (citing N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law§ lO(l)(ii)(a)(ll), (12)).

281 Id. at 743 (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Town Law§ 272-a(l)(b)).
2s2518 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1987).

§

1 l.04[1][a]

LOCAL CONTROL OVER .OIL AND GAS

11-47

zoning law, namely (1) the plain language of the statute, (2) the statutory
scheme as a whole, and (3) the legislative history. 283 Frew Run involved
former provisions of the Mined Land Reclamation Law (MLRL), which
provided that "this title shall supersede all other state and local laws relating
to the extractive mining industry ... :' 284 In Frew Run, the court found that
this MLRL supersession language evinced the intent only to preempt local
regulations dealing with the process of mining, not zoning laws, which do
not apparently "relate" to the mining industry. 285
The supersession language in the MLRL and the OGSML are similar,
except that the MLRL expressly supersedes local laws "relating" to extractive mining, while the OGSML supersedes local laws "relating to the regulation" of the oil, gas, and solution mining industry. The Wallach court saw
no difference between the language in the two statutes, quoting Frew Run
for its conclusion that the "incidental control resulting from the municipality's exercise of its right to regulate land use through zoning is not the
type of regulatory enactment ... which the Legislature could have envisioned as being within the prohibition of the statute:' 286 In other words, as
in Frew Run, the legislature simply did not mean what it said. If it wanted
to preempt zoning, the legislature could have been more specific, as it had
been in enacting statutes related to hazardous waste facilities, community
residences, and gaming. 281
In analyzing the "plain language;' the court also addressed two arguments made by Norse and Cooperstown Holstein Corporation (CHC)
relating to the express exception in the OGSML to the preemption language. First, Norse and CHC argued that the carve-out for local jurisdiction of roads and taxes in the OGSML would be rendered meaningless if
the express preemption language was limited to operational aspects of oil
and gas development. In rejecting this argument, the court concludes that
the regulation of roads and the imposition of taxes can fairly be characterized as operational. 288 Second, Norse and CHC argued that the MLRL
could be distinguished from the OGSML because the former expressly

2 83See

284 Id.

Wallach, 23 N.Y.3d at 744.

(quoting N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law§ 23-2703(2) (1987) (subsequently amended)).

285 Frew

Run, 518 N.E.2d at 923-24 (a construction that would limit a town's power to
adopt zoning regulations should be avoided).
286 Wallach,
287 Id.

288/d.

23 N.Y.3d at 746 (citation omitted) (quoting Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 922).

at 748.
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allows sub-state units to adopt "local zoning ordinances:' but the latter
does not. 289 Specifically, the carve-out in the MLRL allows "local zoning
ordinances or other local laws which impose stricter mined land reclama
tion standards or requirements than those [ in the MLRL] :'290 In Frew Run,
the court concluded that this carve-out in the MLRL for "local zoning
ordinances" was limited to ordinances related to reclamation, but never
answered the question as to why the Legislature needed to carve out zon
ing ordinances at all if the preemption language was limited to operational
matters. 291 Rather than reconcile this difficulty, the Wallach court instead
states that the decision in Frew Run simply was never based on the carve
out in the MLRL. 292
In both cases, the carve-out in the applicable preemption statute was
essentially held to be meaningless to the court's analysis. 293 Admittedly,
the court faithfully applied Frew Run in Wallach, and would likely have
had to overrule Frew Run to reach a different result. The Frew Run analy
sis, however, is flawed because it violates the expressio unius doctrine of
statutory construction. 2�'4 If the preemption language in the MLRL has
nothing to do with land use, then the legislature had no need to carve out
zoning ordinances, even those limited to reclamation. Presumably, zoning
that relates to reclamation is not zoning at all ( despite the express use of
the words "zoning" by the legislature). Again, the legislature did not mean
what it actually said.

289 Id.

at 747 n.4.

2 90 Id. at 745 (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law§ 23-2703(2) (1987)
(subsequently amended)).
291 Frew Run, 518 N.E.2d at 923.
2 92Wallach, 23 N.Y.3d at 747 n.4.
293 See id. ("Contrary to the suggestion of Norse and CHC, we did not uphold the town's
zoning restriction in Frew Run based on the secondary savings clause-it did not fall within
that provision because it was not aimed at reclamation projects. Rather, we held more gen
erally that the preemptive text simply did not encompass the zoning law in the first place.
So too with the operative portion of the OGSMI.:s supersession provision.").
294 Expressio

unius est exclusio alterius is Latin for the expression of one thing implies the
exclusion of others. See Clifton Williams, "Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius;' 15 Marq.
L. Rev. 191 (1931). In Lenape Resources, Inc. v. Town ofAvon, No. 1060-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Livingston Cnty. Mar. 15, 2013) (unpublished), the court dismissed a challenge to a Town of
Avon local one-year moratorium because the court felt constrained by Frew Run. The court
expressed the view, however, that Frew Run was flawed for the very reason that it violated
the expressio unius doctrine. Lenape, slip op. at 4. Lenape was appealed, but the appeal was
dismissed on mootness grounds because the moratorium had expired. See Lenape Res., Inc.
v. Town of Avon, 2014 N.Y. Slip. Op. 06746, 2014 WL 4942318 (App. Div. Oct. 3, 2014).
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After concluding the plain meaning of the statute allows for zoning, the
court turns to the second and third prongs of its "express" preemption analysis, analyzing the statutory scheme as a whole and the legislative history.
As to legislative history, the court finds little support either way. 295 As to
the statutory scheme, however, the court looks to what it views as the purpose of the statute: to prevent waste. The court easily finds that " [n] othing
in the statute points to the conclusion that a municipality's decision not to
permit drilling equates to waste:'296 Further, the court effectively dismisses
the statutory purpose of protecting correlative rights in a footnote. 297
In both Frew Run and Wallach, the court views the issue solely as a matter of express preemption, but largely ignores both the breadth of the preemption language itself and the specificity by which the legislature carved
out local jurisdiction over roads and property taxes (or in Frew Run, zoning ordinances related to reclamation). Rather, the court focuses on the
importance of zoning to home rule municipalities and what it views as the
purpose of the statute. By applying what the court views as the purpose of
the statutory scheme as a whole, the court effectively narrows the generality of the supersession language.298
Further, the level of generality applied by the court changes depending
on the specific statutory language analyzed. The preemption language
itself apparently requires a reference to zoning or local land to apply to
more than operational matters, which are concerned with the prevention
of waste. Zoning is not concerned with the prevention of waste, and therefore clearly is not preempted. But, although the court applies its purpose
test to the preemption language itself, it ignores the implications of the test
with respect to the carve-out language. Property taxes and the regulation
of local roads also have nothing to do with the prevention of waste, and
yet they are considered to be operational matters. This enables the court to
read the carve-outs as consistent with the preemption language.

[b] Room for Concurrent Jurisdiction in New
Mexico
New Mexico lacks an appellate decision as to the preemption of an oil
and gas ordinance, but existing case law implies there is much room for

295 Wallach,

296 Id.

23 N.Y.3d at 752-53.

at 750.

29 7 Id. at 751 n.5. This is in stark contrast to the 1992 Colorado Supreme Court decision
in Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992). For a discussion of Voss, see
§ ll.04[3][a], infra.
298 See

Scalia & Garner, supra note 273, at 19.

11-50

MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE

§ 11.04[1][b]

concurrent jurisdiction of state and local governments. The New Mexico
Attorney General's office authored an advisory letter in 19862 99 concluding
that county regulation was preempted by the New Mexico Oil and Gas
Act.300 That letter, however, has little analysis and predates more current
judicial precedent such as San Pedro Mining Corp. v. Board of County Com
missioners of San ta Fe County. 301
In San Pedro, Santa Fe County enacted a comprehensive land develop
ment code that included extensive permit requirements for mines. 302 The
plaintiff began to operate its mine, and the county ordered it to cease for
lack of a permit. In response, the plaintiff brought suit. 303 The district court
ordered administrative proceedings in the county, which determined that
the plaintiff required a mine permit.304 On appeal, the district court held
that the New Mexico Mining Act (Mining Act) 305 preempted the county's
regulatory authority, but that the County nevertheless maintained residual
zoning power, including the right to require a permit and to impose condi
tions on the grant of the permit. 306
On appeal from the district court, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
first announced the traditional three-part analysis that a local ordinance
may be preempted either expressly, by intent of the State to occupy the
entire field, or by an implied conflict between the state statute and the ordi
nance. 307 The court declined to determine whether the County's power was
a zoning power or a general police power, but held that no preemption had
occurred. 308 Specifically, it held that the County had the power to regulate
much more than just the location of mining activities. 309
299Qffice of the N.M. Att'y Gen., Advisory Letter 86-2, 1986 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen. 515
(Jan. 8, 1986).
300N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 70-2-1 to -38. See also Kramer & Martin, supra note l, at
§ 4.05[2][b][viii] (discussing advisory letter and New Mexico trend toward concurrent
jurisdiction).
301909 P.2d 754 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
302Jd. at 757.
303Jd.
304 Id. at 757-58.
305N.M. Stat. Ann.§§ 69-36-1 to -20.
306San Pedro, 909 P.2d at 758.
307 Id. at 758-60. See Rancho Lobo, Ltd. v. Dev argas, 303 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2002)
(succinctly summarizing the test set forth in San Pedro).
308 San Pedro, 909 P.2d at 758.
309Jd.
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Section 69-36-4 of the Mining Act provided (and continues to provide)
that "[a]fter the effective date of the New Mexico Mining Act and until
the commission adopts regulations necessary to carry out the provisions
of the New Mexico Mining Act, county mining laws or ordinances shall
apply to mining within their jurisdictions in New Mexico:' 310 San Pedro
Mining Corporation argued this provision meant that once regulations
were adopted, county ordinances no longer applied. The court of appeals
disagreed, finding the Mining Act ambiguous and holding that no express
preemption occurred, while comparing the Mining Act to clear and unambiguous statutory language preempting local control over pesticides. 311
As to implied preemption, the court declined to examine specific provisions of the ordinance because the plaintiff argued only for the preemption
of the entire ordinance. The court stated in dicta that to the extent specific
provisions of the ordinance actually conflicted with the Mining Act or
underlying regulations, the ordinance would be preempted. But, according
to the court, the state statute did not address matters that traditionally con cern local governments, including "possible nuisances ... , compatibility of
the [activity] with the use made of surrounding lands, ... and the effect of
the ... activity on surrounding property values:'3 12
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit subsequently extended
San Pedro to its limits in Rancho Lobo, Ltd. v. Devargas. 313 The plaintiff in
Rancho Lobo was granted a permit from the Forestry Division to harvest
trees under New Mexico's Forest Conservation Act. 314 Rio Arriba County
then informed the plaintiff that it must apply for a timber harvest permit under a county ordinance. Rather than seek the county permit, the
plaintiff challenged the ordinance on its face as preempted under state
law.3 15 The ordinance prohibited clear-cutting without a variance, whereas
clear-cutting was allowed under the Forest Conservation Act. 316 The district court found that the state statute expressly preempted the county
ordinance, 317 but the Tenth Circuit disagreed, straining doctrine to allow
the local ordinance to stand.
310 Id.

at 759 (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 69-36-4(B)).

3 11 Id.

(citing N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 76-4-9.1).

312Id.
313 303

F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906 (2003).

314N.M.

Stat. Ann.§§ 68-2-1 to -25.

315 Rancho

316 Id.
317Id.

Lobo, 303 F.3d at 1199-1200.

at 1200.
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Express preemption was not at issue because the Forest Conservation
Act did not expressly prohibit local government regulation. Field preemption was a possibility because of the comprehensive nature of the state law.
Nevertheless, the court took field preemption off the table, finding it was
bound by San Pedro to find concurrent jurisdiction. 318 Turning to implied
preemption by conflict, the court defined the scope of the state statute as
narrowly as possible, rendering almost meaningless the test that a local
ordinance may not prohibit that which a state statute allows. Just because
the Forest Conservation Act itself allowed dear-cutting did not preclude
local governments from banning the practice. 319

[c] Conflict Preemption (Usually) Limited to
Operational Conflicts in Colorado
In Colorado, implied conflict preemption is usually limited to technical
operational conflicts. 320 In the 1992 case of Board of County Commissioners, La Plata County v. Bowen/Edwards Associates, Jnc., 321 the Colorado
Supreme Court considered whether the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act (Colorado O&G Act) 322 preempted the regulation by the County
of oil and gas development under the County's land use code. 323 The
County specified various categories of facilities with specific application
permit requirements subject to the approval of either the County Planning
Commission or the Board of County Commissioners. 3 24
The court first concluded that the Colorado O&G Act did not expressly
preempt the county ordinance. Given the distinct interests between the
County (land use control) and the State (oil and gas development), express
preemption must be unequivocal. 325 The court also concluded that the Colorado O&G Act showed no implied intent to occupy the entire field. While
the Colorado O&G Act shows the State's interest in uniform regulation of
the technical operational aspects of production, there was no intent in the
318 Id.

at 1203-04.

319 Id.

at 1206.

320 The word "usually" is used because, as discussed below, the Colorado Supreme Court
has recognized that a ban on oil and gas operations conflicts with state law because the local
law frustrates the state statutory scheme, creating a conflict with a significant state interest.
See§ l 1.04[3][a], infra.
3 21 830

P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1992) (en bane).

322Colo.

Rev. Stat.§§ 34-60-101 to -130.

32 3 Bowen/Edwards,
324 Id.

at 1050.

325 Id.

at 1057.

830 P.2d at 1056-57.
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statute to preempt all aspects of a county's authority to regulate land use
just because the land is a source of production. 3 2 6 The court then turned to
implied conflict preemption, narrowly reading the court of appeals' 1988
holding in Oborne v. Board of County Commissioners of Douglas County321
as applying solely to specific technical operational conflicts. 328 The court
thus remanded the case to the court of appeals to direct the district court to
conduct further fact-finding on a provision-by-provision basis. 329
The court did state, however, that technical conditions on the drilling
or pumping of wells where no conditions were imposed under state law
would be a conflict, as would safety regulations or land restoration requirements that conflict with state law requirements. 330 Under Colorado law, the
General Assembly could with more specific language preempt a broader
sphere of county zoning actions than technical operational conflicts, but
the COGCC has no such independent power. 331
In the 2002 case of Town ofFrederick v. North American Resources Co.,332
the Colorado Court of Appeals applied Bowen/Edwards. The defendant,
326 Id.

at 1058.

327 764

P.2d 397 (Colo. App. 1988). The Supreme Court of Colorado has spoken as to
the meaning of Oborne, but one could read the court of appeals holding more broadly. In
Oborne, the Colorado Court of Appeals considered the denial of a special use permit for an
oil and gas drilling operation by Douglas County. Id. at 399. The court discussed that the
county regulation was concerned with water contamination, fire danger, reclamation, and
security for plugging and abandonment, all subjects which were covered by the Colorado
O&G Act. Id. at 401. But, the court also stated that the implied conflict analysis becomes
irrelevant when the state has preempted the field, buttressing its conclusion with the recent
amendment to the Colorado O&G Act to grant the COGCC the additional authority to
regulate "the health, safety, and welfare of the general public." Id. at 402 {quoting Colo.
Rev. Stat.§ 34-60-106(11)). Douglas County actually conceded in light of the amendment
that any authority it may have had to deny the permit request had been eliminated. Id.
The description of Oborne in Bowen/Edwards belies that the court of appeals relied on an
implied preemption of the entire field analysis. Maybe one could describe the "field" in
Oborne narrowly as the technical operational aspects of oil and gas development, including
aspects relating to health, safety, and welfare, but even that characterization is unsatisfactory given that the Bowen/Edwards court remanded the case to the trial court to examine
specific operational conflicts.
328 Bowen/Edwards,

329 Id.

at 1060 n.7.

330 Id.

at 1060.

830 P.2d at 1060.

331 See

Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs v. COGCC, 81 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Colo. App. 2003) (COGCC
Rule 303{a), providing that a state-issued permit to drill shall "be binding with respect to
any conflicting local governmental permit or land use approval process:' is invalid on its
face as expanding the operational conflict standard from Bowen/Edwards).
332 60

P.3d 758 (Colo. App. 2002).
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North American Resources Company (NARCO), drilled a well after
receiving a permit from COGCC, but did not comply with the Town's
requirement for a special use permit. The trial court enjoined NARCO
until it complied with the local zoning ordinance, but also invalidated
the Town's setback, noise abatement, and visual impact requirements as
impliedly preempted by operational conflict.333 The trial court also found
preemption where the Town ordinance gave the Town the authority to
directly assess penalties for violations of COGCC rules. 334 The court of
appeals affirmed.335
NARCO conceded that requirements to obtain building permits for
above-ground structures, maintain access roads, and submit emergency
response and fire protection plans were valid local land use concerns. 336
But it also argued that the ability of the Town to attach conditions to a special use permit frustrated the State's interests. The court disagreed because
the Town had no discretion not to approve a permit or to attach conditions
beyond those specifically set out in the ordinance. 337 This conclusion may
have been different if NARCO had applied for a permit and was denied or
extensive conditions were attached. Further, in reaching its holding, the
court noted that COGCC promulgated extensive regulations dealing with
oil and gas operations after the General Assembly amended the Colorado
O&G Act. The changes did not occupy the entire field of oil and gas regulation, but the additional regulations might give rise to additional areas of
operational conflict. 338

333 Id.

at 765.

3 34Id.

The Colorado O&G Act authorizes "any person or party in interest adversely
affected" to sue to enjoin violations of COGCC rules if the COGCC has failed to do so.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-114. But it also requires notification in writing to COGCC and a
request that COGCC sue first. The town's ordinance was preempted by operational conflict
because it did not include the notice requirement. Town of Frederick, 60 P.3d at 765. The
court did not state whether including the notice requirement would cure the conflict.
335 Town

of Frederick, 60 P.3d at 767. In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals
considered legislation adopted by the General Assembly in 1996 that added the following
language to the Colorado O&G Act: "Nothing in this subsection (15) shall affect the ability
of a local government to charge a reasonable and nondiscriminatory fee for inspection and
monitoring for road damage and compliance with local fire codes, land use permit conditions,
and local building codes:' Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 34-60-106(15) (emphasis added). This language
further supported the conclusion that the General Assembly did not intend to preempt
local regulation of oil and gas operations. Town of Frederick, 60 P.3d at 763.
336Town

ofFrederick, 60 P.3d at 766.

337Id.
338 Id.

at 763.
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What constitutes an operational conflict obviously depends on the view
of the court and will vary from case to case. While COGCC has no independent power to preempt all local regulation, it may create operational
conflicts when it expands its rules. More extensive state-level regulations
may be more burdensome to industry, but Town of Frederick teaches that
the extent of this statewide regulatory burden affects the likelihood of an
operational conflict.

[2] Avoiding Preemption by Constitutional Mandate
to Protect the Environment in Pennsylvania
In the most unique of preemption cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court recently rejected notions of the sub-state unit as a creature of the
state, finding preemption illegal under the state constitution. The Pennsylvania case is not technically a preemption case, but it highlights the lengths
to which courts may go to protect the environment and the character of
local communities.

[a] Background-Huntley and Range Resources
As discussed above, Act 13 was adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature
in February 2012, in part to preempt local ordinances. Section 3302 of Act
13 expressly supersedes local ordinances "purporting to regulate oil and
gas operations regulated by Chapter 32 (relating to development);' except
those adopted pursuant to the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code
(MPC) and the Flood Plain Management Act (FPMA). It further provides
that even those local ordinances adopted under the MPC (i.e., zoning or
subdivision and land development ordinances) or the FPMA (pertaining
to floodplains) may not "impose conditions, requirements or limitations
on the same features of oil and gas operations" that are regulated under
chapter 32 of Act 13.339 Section 3303 of Act 13 expands on the preemption
language in section 3302 by declaring that state environmental acts "occupy
the entire field of regulation:' and that the Commonwealth "preempts and
supersedes the local regulation of oil and gas operations:'340 In addition to
the restrictions in sections 3302 and 3303, section 3304 requires that oil
and gas development be allowed as a permitted use in any municipal zoning district, and that restrictions on oil and gas development by municipalities be no greater than those placed on other industrial uses. 341

33953 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3302. Section 3302 mirrors section 601.602 of the Pennsylvania
Oil and Gas Act (Pennsylvania O&G Act), which was repealed by Act 13. See 58 Pa. Stat.
§ 601.602 (repealed by Act of Feb. 14, 2012, 2012 Pa. Laws 87, No. 13, § 3(2)).
34053 Pa. Cons. Stat.§ 3303.
341 Id. §

3304(b)(3), (5).
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The specificity in section 3304 preempting zoning as to the location of
wells is a response to Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Borough of Oakmont.342 There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act (Pennsylvania O&G Act)
prohibited the Borough Council from regulating the location of a gas well
under its MPC zoning power. The legislature amended the Pennsylvania O&G Act in 1992 to broaden its express preemption provision (with
language that is substantially similar to section 3302 of Act 13).343 After
first recognizing that sub-state units are creatures of the state,344 the court
found that the borough zoning ordinance did not "impose conditions,
requirements or limitations on the same features of oil and gas well operations regulated by the [Pennsylvania O&G Act], or accomplish the same
purposes as set forth in the [Pennsylvania O&G Act]:' activities that were
preempted.345
The court first held that the Pennsylvania O&G Act regulates the manner
of operations of oil and gas wells, while the borough ordinance concerned
the location of wells, regardless that the local ordinance might preclude
oil and gas drilling in certain zones. 346 The court then highlighted the
difference in the purposes between the state law and the local ordinance.
Although both were concerned with protecting public health and safety,
zoning ordinances are focused on preserving the character of residential
neighborhoods and encouraging beneficial and compatible land uses. 347
On the same day, the court in Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC v.
Salem Township 348 struck down a municipal ordinance based on both
express preemption and principles of conflict preemption. 349 In contrast
to the ordinance in Huntley, the Salem ordinance was not concerned with

342964 A.2d 855 (Pa. 2009).

34 3Section 601.602 of the Pennsylvania O&G Act provided in relevant part: "No ordinances or enactments adopted pursuant to the [MPC and FPMA] shall contain provisions
which impose conditions, requirements or limitations on the same features of oil and gas
well operations regulated by this act or that accomplish the same purposes as set forth in
this act." 58 Pa. Stat.§ 601.602 (repealed by Act of Feb. 14, 2012, 2012 Pa. Laws 87, No. 13,
§ 3(2)).
344Huntley, 964 A.2d at 862.
345 Id.

at 863 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 58 Pa. Stat.

346 Id.

at 864.

347 Id.

at 865.

348964 A.2d 869 (Pa. 2009).
349Id.

at 877.
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controlling the location of wells under zoning principles, but was directed
at oil and gas operations by establishing permitting procedures such as
bonding requirements, plugging, and site restoration, and the imposition
of costs to restore streets. 35° Further, even after compliance with the permitting procedure, issuance of a permit was at the discretion of the Board
of Supervisors at a public meeting. 351
After Huntley and Range Resources, it was clear that the state could preempt ordinances that sought to control the operation of oil and gas wells.
More broadly, Huntley also implied that the creator state could potentially
preempt sub-state unit zoning ordinances as to the location of wells, if state
legislation was drafted precisely enough.

[b] The Common:wealth Court Holding in
Robinson Township
The notion that the state creator could preempt local government control over well location was first turned on its head when section 3304 of
Act 13 was invalidated by the commonwealth court in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 352 The petitioners alleged, and the
respondents agreed, that Act 13 required local governments to modify
their zoning ordinances. 353 This, the commonwealth court held, violated
substantive due process because it eviscerated the ability of sub-state units
to control incompatible uses and protect neighboring property owners. 354
In other words, Act 13 did not protect the ability of sub-state units to keep
the "pig" out of the "parlor" that the U.S. Supreme Court originally protected in Euclid. 355
Although finding a substantive due process violation, the commonwealth
court considered and rejected the argument that section 3304 denied substate units the ability to meet their obligations to protect the state's natural

350 Id.

at 875.

351 Id.

at 876.

35252 A.3d 463, 494 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part,
remanded in part, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). The commonwealth court also held that section
3215(b)(4) of Act 13 was unconstitutional. Per the court, the absence of standards for the
granting of waivers to well setback requirements was an impermissible delegation to the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) of legislative authority
under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 52 A.3d at 493-94.
353 52

A.3d at 469.

354 Id.

at 485.

355 Id.

at 484.
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resources under article l, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
(Environmental Rights Amendment),356 which provides in part:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
gt!nerations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.357

As viewed by the commonwealth court, the state creator had, with the
tool of preemption, relieved the creature sub-state units of their responsibilities to consider environmental concerns under the Environmental
Rights Amendment.

[c] The Supreme Court Holding in Robinson
Township
In what is already regarded as a seminal environmental law holding,358 a
plurality of three justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wholeheartedly disagreed on state constitutional grounds.359 The cross-appellants
(referred to by the plurality as the "citizens") did not dispute that the General Assembly had the power to preempt local laws or even to remove their
zoning power entirely.360 But the citizens argued that so long as zoning
power is granted, local governments must ensure that the use of property
does not cause harm to neighboring property rights or interests and that
zoning protects health and welfare. 361 Rather than view the case as a zoning matter, however, the court viewed the dispute as an "asserted vindication of citizens' rights to quality of life on their properties and in their
hometowns" under the state's Environmental Rights Amendment.362
3561d. at 488-89. The commonwealth court previously had held that in addition to the
state, sub-state units are also trustees of the state's natural resources. Cmty. Coll. of Del.
Cnty. v. Fox, 342 A.2d 468 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).

35 7 Pa.

Const. art l, § 27.

358See, e.g., John Dernbach, "The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Robinson Township
Decision: A Step Back for Marcellus Shale, a Step Forward for Environmental Rights and
the Public Trust:' Widener Envt'l Law Ctr. Blog (Dec. 21, 2013).
359 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). Justice Todd and Justice
McCaffery joined Chief Justice Castille in striking down sections 3215(b)(4), 3215(d),
3303, and 3304 based on the Environmental Rights Amendment. Id. at 1000. Justice Baer
in concurrence would strike down the same sections, but instead based on substantive due
process grounds. Id. at 1000-01 (Baer, J., concurring). Justice Saylor and Justice Eakin dissented. Id. at 1014 (Saylor, J. dissenting); id. at 1016 (Eakin, J., dissenting).

360 Id. at 936.
361 Id.

3621d. at 942 (citing Pa. Const. art. l, § 27).
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To the plurality, the declared "right" of the citizens in the first clause ofthe
Environmental Rights Amendment to clean air and pure water is the type
of individual right on par with political rights "inherent in man's nature
and preserved rather than created by the Pennsylvania Constitution:' 363
The second and third clauses of the Environmental Rights Amendment
describe the state's public trust duties over its public natural resources.
The court defined these resources to include not only public lands but also
"resources that implicate the public interest, such as ambient air, surface
and ground water, wild flora, and fauna ... :'3 64
After discussion of general principles applicable to trusts and trustees,
the court held that the Commonwealth has two distinct obligations as
trustee. One of those duties (characterized as the second obligation) is
to act affirmatively to enact environmental protections. According to the
court, because it has enacted environmental protection statutes, "the Gen eral Assembly has not shied from this duty ... :'365 The other duty (characterized as the first obligation) is to refrain from "permitting or encouraging
the degradation, diminution, or depletion of public natural resources"
either through direct state action or the failure to constrain the actions of
private parties.366 In respect of this duty, Act 13 was held to degrade the
corpus of the trust. 367
Further, both the state and sub-state units have the obligation as guardians to protect the public trust. Act 13 violates the Environmental Rights
Amendment, not only because it encourages development at the expense
of the environment but also because it forces sub-state units to violate
the Amendment. 368 According to the court, "constitutional commands
regarding municipalities' obligations and duties to their citizens cannot be
abrogated by statute:'369 The state may create or destroy sub-state units,
but once created, they must be allowed to protect their citizens from environmental harms.

363 Id.

at 948.

364 Id.

at 955.

365 Id.

at 958.

366Jd.
367 Id.

at 980.

368 Jd. at 978 ("Act 13 thus commands municipalities to ignore their obligations under
[the Environmental Rights Amendment] and further directs municipalities to take affirmative actions to undo existing protections of the environment in their localities.").

369 Id.

at 977.
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In addition to sections 3303 and 3304, the court also enjoined sections
3215(b)(4), and 321S(d) as violating the Environmental Rights Amendment.370 Section 3215(b) contains setback requirements for wells from
streams, springs, bodies of water, and wetlands.371 Clause (b)(4), however,
states that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
(PADEP) "shall,, waive the setbacks if the operator submits a plan "identifying additional measures, facilities or practices to be employed ... necessary to protect the waters of [the] Commonwealth:'372 If granted, the waiver
"shall include additional terms and conditions required by the department
necessary to protect the waters of [the] Commonwealth:'373 The court
found that the standard of "necessary,, protection was inadequate, lacking "identifiable and readily-enforceable environmental standards:'374 It
also found the remainder of section 3215(b) unseverable. 375 The result is
that Pennsylvania law no longer contains setbacks from water bodies and
wetlands.376
Under section 3215(d), the PADEP may (butis not required) to consider
comments of a municipality in making a determination on a well permit,
but section 3215(d) then expressly denies municipalities the right to appeal
the PADEP's permitting decision. 377 Because it marginalized local participation, section 3215(d) also was struck down. 378 The court then remanded
to the commonwealth court to determine whether any remaining provisions of Act 13 or the Act in its entirety might be invalid under severability principles. 379 The court, however, did not remand for fact-finding
any question as to the balancing of environmental harms and economic

370Id. at 1000.
371 58 Pa. Cons. Stat.§ 3215(b).
372 Robinson

Twp., 83 A.3d at 973 (quoting 58 Pa. Cons. Stat.§ 3215(b){4)).

373Jd.

(quoting 58 Pa. Cons. Stat.§ 3215(b)(4)).

374 Id.

at 983.

375 1d.

at 999.

376 Governor Tom Corbett has urged drillers to voluntarily comply with the stricken
setback requirements. See Matt Fair, "Pa. Gov. Urges Drillers to Abide by Axed Fracking
Rules:' Law360 (Jan. 6, 2014).
37758 Pa. Cons. Stat.§ 3215(d).
378 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 984. Note that Colorado rules allow local government participation in permitting decisions. See§ 11.05[2], infra.
3 7 9Robinson

Twp., 83 A.3d at 999.
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benefits relative to shale gas development. 380 Instead, the court adopted
the citizens' conclusions that the "optimal" accommodation of industry
under Act 13 "unquestionably has and will have a lasting, and undeniably
detrimental, impact" on surface and ground water and other aspects of the
natural environment that make up the public trust. 381
Justice Eakin in dissent was particularly concerned with the speculative
judicial fact-finding undertaken by the plurality as to the harms of oil and
gas development on the environment.382 For both Justice Eakin and Justice
Saylor, allowing the court to substitute its judgment for that of the General
Assembly violated the very idea of separation of powers. 383 The dissent
of Justice Saylor also found the plurality's opinion to be very much an
affront to the creature theory, finding "much force in the notion that, since
municipalities are creatures of the sovereign and entirely dependent upon
the will of the state for their very existence, they have no authority or duty
to challenge the state's alteration of their delegated powers:' 384

[d] On Remand in the Commonwealth Court
On remand in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth (Robinson Twp.
JI),385 the commonwealth court gutted most of what remained of chapter
33 of Act 13, invalidating sections 3305, 3306, 3307, 3308, and 3309(a). 386
Sections 3305 through 3309 generally provide for review and invalidation
by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) and the commonwealth court oflocal ordinances that violate either (1) the MPC; (2) chapter
32 (relating to operations); or (3) chapter 33 (relating to preemption oflocal
ordinances), and related remedies. 387 Although two of the three preemption provisions (sections 3303 and 3304) in chapter 33 were struck down,
380The general counsel for Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett filed a motion with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the issue of balancing as to the environmental harms of
shale gas development to be sent back to the commonwealth court for evidentiary hearings.
See Matt Fair, "Pa. Gov. Wants Landmark Fracking Ruling Reconsidered:' Law360 (Jan. 2,
2014).
381 Robinson

Twp., 83 A.3d at 975.

382Jd . at 1015 n.2 ("We can speculate about which transport will be better or worse, but
we have held no hearings, taken no evidence. My speculations are just that, but they are the
same type of speculation that girds the lead opinion's broad language and cross-appellants'
parade of horribles:').
383 Id.

at 1013.

384 Id.

at 1014.

38596

A.3d 1104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).

386 Id.

at 1122.

3875g

Pa. Cons. Stat.§§ 3305-3309.

11-62

MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE

§

ll.04[2][e]

most of section 3302 remains, as does chapter 32 (relating to the "how:· not
the "where,, of oil and gas operations) and the MPC. Why then were the
remedial provisions invalidated if other operative requirements remain to
be enforced? The majority reasons that the "statutory scheme cannot be
implemented;' 388 but as Judges Brobson and McCullough argued in dissent, there is no reason the remedial provisions should not be severable. 389
The court also invalidated the last sentence of section 3302, which provides that " [t Jhe Commonwealth, by this section, preempts and supersedes
the regulation of oil and gas operations as provided in this chapter:'39o It
reasoned that the only operative and substantive provisions, sections 3303
and 3304, were struck down, so nothing remained in chapter 33 to preempt
and supersede state law. But the court did not invalidate the remainder of
section 3302,391 which itself preempts the "how,, of oil and gas operations.
It is perplexing how the majority reads section 3302 out of the statute while
at the same time finds that all but its last sentence remains valid. The court
enjoins the application and enforcement of section 3302 as it relates to all
of chapter 33, but section 3302 is in chapter 33, so it is not exactly clear
what the court means. As Judges Brobson and McCullough understand
the majority opinion, all but the last sentence of section 3302 remains
enforceable. 392

[e] Implications of Robinson Township
A number of conclusions may be drawn from the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court holding. First, according to the court, before the legislature acts,
the Environmental Rights Amendment now "requires each branch of
388 Robinson

Twp. II, 96 A.3d at 1122.

at 1124 (Brobson, J., dissenting in part); id. at 1126 (McCullough, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
389 Id.

390 Id.

at 1120 (quoting 58 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3302). The only difference between the language in section 3302 and section 602 of the previous Pennsylvania O&G Act, 58 Pa. Stat.
§ 601.602 (repealed by Act of Feb. 14, 2012, Pa. Laws No. 87, No. 13, § 3(2)), considered
in Huntley, is that section 3302 supersedes the regulation of oil and gas operations "as
provided in this chapter;' and section 602 supersedes the regulation of oil and gas operations "as herein defined:' Without adequate explanation, the court found this distinction
significant, see Robinson Twp. II, 96 A.3d at 1121 n.27, even though section 3302 (which
still preempts the "how" of oil and gas operations) itself contains supersession language. In
dissent, Judge Brobson also argues that the majority disregards section 4 of Act 13, where
the legislature explained that any changes in the language of section 3302 from section 602
were conforming stylistic changes only. Id. at 1123 n.1.
391 See id. at 1119 (severing the last sentence from "the remaining valid provisions" of
section 3302).
392 See id. at 1123 (Brobson, J., dissenting in part); id. at 1126 (McCullough, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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government to consider in advance of proceeding the environmental effect
of any proposed action on the constitutionally protected features:'393 At
the federal level, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)394
requires the preparation of environmental impact statements for major
federal actions. 395 Similarly, environmental studies are required at the
state level in New York under the New York State Environmental Quality
Review Act (SEQR) 396 and in California under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).397 Those Acts contain detailed requirements,
underlying regulations, and significant guidance. In contrast, the judgemade environmental review now required in Pennsylvania contains no
meaningful standards,398 and is arguably broader in that it applies to any
proposed action that affects the natural environment in trust.
Second, so long as environmental reviews are completed as required,
NEPA would still allow a project to proceed, even if such a project would
cause environmental harm. Such is not the case in Pennsylvania. After
Robinson Township, no decision of the Pennsylvania General Assembly
that promotes development will be immune from judicial oversight. Any
government decision to roll back environmental protections likely will be
suspect, including those that the government determines on ex post analysis unduly restrict development to the economic detriment of the state. 399
The General Assembly may satisfy its duty to protect the public trust of
the natural resources "by enacting legislation that adequately restrains
actions of private parties likely to cause harm to protected aspects of our
environment:'400 But when legislation is enacted that promotes, rather than
constrains, development, the State "must exercise its police powers to foster sustainable development in a manner that respects the reserved rights
393 Robinson
39442

Twp., 83 A.3d at 952 (emphasis added).

u.s.c. §§ 4321-4347.

395 See

id. § 4332{C).

396 N.Y.

Envtl. Conserv. Law§§ 8-0101 to -0117. See supra note 91.

397See Cal. Pub. Res. Code§§ 21000-21189.3.
398 See Paul

K. Stockman & Erin N. Fischer, "The Harmful Effects of Robinson Township
v. Commonwealth;' Law360 (Jan. 6, 2014).
399The court states that the trust's directions "do not require a freeze of the existing
public natural resource stock;' and would allow "legitimate development;' but only with
the "evident goal of promoting sustainable development:' Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 958.
The line between permissible and impermissible development obviously is unclear, but at
a minimum seems to require the state, "so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to
(trust resources]:' Id. (citing Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727-29
(Cal. 1983)).
4

oo Id. at 979.
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of the people to a clean, healthy, and esthetically-pleasing environment:'401
In this sense, the Environmental Rights Amendment appears to act like a
one-way ratchet. 402 Only more protective legislation will be permitted.
Third, regardless of their status as creatures of the state, sub-state units
may now act under a strong form precautionary principle to prevent
impairment of the local environment unimpeded by state-wide interests. 403 The Environmental Rights Amendment "would permit not only
reactive but also anticipatory protection of the environment for the benefit
of current and future generations:'404 Once sub-state units have been created, the General Assembly cannot strip these units of the right to protect their citizens or frustrate these citizens' expectations concerning the
environment. 405 More broadly, sub-state units not only have a right but
also an obligation, concurrent with the obligation of the State, to protect
the environment. 406 Clearly, sub-state units that do not carefully consider
environmental impacts in oil and gas zoning actions will be subject to suit
under the Environmental Rights Amendment. 407 Sub-state units could
also be subject to suit for not acting in an anticipatory manner by enacting more restrictive zoning ordinances, or even bans, in environmentally
sensitive locations. 408
401 Id.

at 981.

402

This one-way ratchet effect was articulated to the author in an email from Professor
Bruce Kramer on January 1, 2014.
403 The

strong precautionary principle requires regulation when an activity poses a serious threat to human health or the environment even though the nature or extent of the
threat is not fully understood. The principle also switches the burden to the proponent of
the activity to show that the activity should be allowed. See Noah M. Sachs, "Rescuing the
Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics;' 11 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1285, 1288 (2011).
404 Robinson

Twp., 83 A.3d at 963 (emphasis added).

405 See

id. at 977-78.

406 See

id.

407 In

a recent decision, the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, struck down a conditional use permit granted by Fairfield Township to an oil and gas
operator based on a petition of local residents, finding under Robinson Township that the
Township "has a substantial and immediate interest in protecting the environment and the
quality oflife within its borders" that "is a constitutional charge that must be respected by
all levels of government:' Gorsline v. Fairfield Twp., No. 14-000130, slip op. at 25 (Pa. Ct. of
Common Pleas Lycoming Cnty. Aug. 29, 2014) (citing Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 919-20,
952).
408

Application of the strong form of the precautionary principle can actually be seen
in the holding of the court itself. The plurality did not base its decision on any factual
showing of the environmental harm attendant to hydraulic fracturing. Rather, the plurality
found on its own that "the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale Formation will produce a
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Fourth, the plurality disregards the fact that oil and gas must be produced where it is located, which necessarily involves disproportionate
burdens. The plurality struck down the statewide permitting of oil and
gas as a matter of right in part as "incapable of conserving or maintaining
the constitutionally-protected aspects of the public environment and of a
certain qualify of life:'409 But it also based its holding on its concern that
"some properties and communities will carry much heavier environmental
and habitability burdens than others" as inconsistent with the obligation
of the State to act for the benefit of "all of the people:' 410 Even in an area
where landowners generally support shale gas development, after Robinson Township should the concerns of a few surface owners prevail because
such surface owners are disproportionately affected compared to surface
owners, in say, Pittsburgh? If sub-state units must, in accordance with their
Environmental Rights Amendment duties, always act to control such disproportionate burdens, will places remain to drill in Pennsylvania?
Fifth, consider what the court did not do. Neither the supreme court nor
the commonwealth court on remand invalidated section 3302 of Act 13.
Under section 3302, a local ordinance still may not purport to regulate oil
and gas activity outside the confines of the MPC and the FPMA, without
even getting into the features and purpose analysis in Huntley. And even
when a sub-state unit complies with the MPC or FPMA, consistent with
Huntley, sub-state units still may not regulate the manner of oil and gas
operations, even though they may prescribe the location of wells. 411 In
addition to the dissents in Robinson Twp. II, supporting this conclusion
is a recent opinion in ION Geophysical Corp. v. Hempfield Township, 412
where the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
granted a preliminary injunction to a seismic operator against a township
that refused to allow seismic testing on township roads. Concluding that
the operator demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, the court
found that section 3302 preempted the Township from banning seismic

detrimental effect on the environment, on the people, their children, and future generations, and potentially on the public purse, perhaps rivaling the environmental effects of coal
extraction:' Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 976. One could view the court as simply antagonistic
to oil and gas development, see Stockman & Fischer, supra note 398, but the court's broad
language not only empowers local governments to control development in furtherance of
environmental protection but also actually demands that they do so.
409 Robinson
410 Id.

Twp., 83 A.3d at 979.

at 980. See also Dernbach, supra note 358.

4 11 See §
412 No.

ll.04[2][a], supra.

14-410, 2014 WL 1405397 (WD. Pa. Apr. 10, 2014).
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testing in its jurisdiction.413 As section 3302 was allowed to stand, Pennsylvania sub-state units may only satisfy their trust obligations under the
Environmental Rights Amendment by regulating the location of wells, not
through oil and gas operational performance standards that presumably
still conflict with state law under Huntley.
Finally, when rewriting Act 13 (or starting from scratch) it appears the
state legislature must not only allow sub-state units to control development
at the local level but must also give local governments a seat at the table
in state-level permitting decisions. By striking down section 3215(d), the
court requires the State to account for local conditions so as not to cause
a disparate impact on trust beneficiaries.414 It would also seem to demand
that local governments have a right to appeal permitting decisions. 415

[3] Some Limitations on Local Control
Despite the predilection of some courts to avoid preemption, some
courts may be more critical of a complete ban than of traditional zoning or
health and safety regulations. While a ban may not present discrete operational conflicts, it frustrates the overall purposes of oil and gas conservation statutes to efficiently produce oil and gas.

[a] A Complete Ban Frustrates Regulatory Scheme
in Colorado
In the 1992 case of Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Jnc.,416 the Colorado Supreme
Court considered whether a complete ban on oil and gas exploration
and production in the home-rule City of Greeley was preempted by the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act (Colorado O&G Act). 417 The
court began by noting that zoning authority to control land use within a

413 Id. at *9. According to the court, the Robinson Township case has no effect on Pennsylvania's existing oil and gas laws that were either enacted before Act 13 or not at issue
in the case. Id. at *7. In another recent case, the commonwealth court refused to address
whether townships may regulate seismic operations by mandating the execution of "seismic
agreements" or prohibit seismic operations by administrative decree. Seitel Data, Ltd. v. Ctr.
Twp., 92 A.3d 851 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014). While section 3306 of Act 13 grants jurisdiction
to the commonwealth court in an action brought by a party aggrieved by the enactment or
enforcement of a local ordinance that violates the preemption provisions in section 3302,
the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because the township defendants had not
actually enacted ordinances. Accordingly, the court transferred the actions to the court of
common pleas. Id. at 864.
41 4 Robinson

Twp., 83 A.3d at 984.

415 The court refers to the lack of a right to appeal as a "remarkable provision:· Id. at 973.
416830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992).
417 Colo. Rev. Stat.§§ 34-60-101 to -130.
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home-rule city's borders is a matter of local concern.418 Further, nothing in
the Colorado O&G Act showed any intent of the legislature to preempt all
aspects ofland use authority. 419 The court then turned to the multi-factor
test for matters of mixed state and local concern. The need for statewide
uniformity favored the state, as a complete ban on drilling could cause
waste and affect correlative rights in a pool that extends beyond the city
borders.420 Similarly, the ban caused extraterritorial economic effects by
limiting production to the portion of a common pool that is outside the
border of the city. The regulation of oil and gas also was found to be a matter traditionally subject to state rather than local control. 421
Does Voss provide grounds independent from technical operational conflicts to overturn a local law? It seems to. Courts may confuse this conflicts
analysis with an implied field preemption analysis, but the Colorado courts
have been careful to state that Colorado state law does not occupy the entire
field of oil and gas regulation. Although Bowen/Edwards and Voss were
issued on the same day, they contain very different analytical approaches to
the question of conflict preemption. Voss focuses on the regulatory scheme
as a whole in the case of a complete ban, while Bowen/Edwards examined
technical operational conflicts when the local ordinance seeks to control,
rather than ban, all operations.
On August 27, 2014, Boulder County District Court Judge D.D. Mallard
struck down the City of Lafayette, Colorado ban on new oil and gas extraction activities on summary judgment.422 Rather than simply rely on Voss,
Judge Mallard somewhat mixed together the operational conflicts analysis
from Bowen/Edwards and the regulatory scheme conflict analysis from
Voss, finding that the Lafayette ban irreconcilably conflicted with state law,
and permanently enjoining the entire Lafayette charter amendment.423
The court never addressed the provisions of the charter amendment that
sought to strip corporations of their constitutional rights of personhood.
Arguably, it had no reason to do so because only corporations that violated the prohibitions on oil and gas activity were stripped of such rights.

4 1 8Voss,

803 P.2d at 1064.

419 Id.

at 1066.

420 Id.

at 1067.

421 Id.

at 1068.

422 0rder

Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, COGA v. City of Lafayette, No.
13CV31746 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. Aug. 27, 2014).
423 Id.

at 11-12.
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Although the court never so stated, the provisions infringing constitutional
rights could not reasonably be severed from the impermissible ban.

[b] Whether a Ban on Hydraulic Fracturing Is
Preempted in Colorado
A complete ban on oil and gas operations was struck down in Voss, 424 but
two trial courts in Colorado recently went further, holding that a ban on
hydraulic fracturing also impermissibly conflicts with state law. On July 24,
2014, Boulder County District Court Judge D.D. Mallard struck down the
voter-initiated ban adopted by the City of Longmont, 425 and on August 7,
2014, Larimer County Judge Gregory Lammons struck down the five-year
moratorium adopted by Fort Collins,426 in each case granting plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment.
Both courts found a technical operational conflict between the local and
state laws.427 Judge Mallard stated, "The operational conflict in this case
is obvious. The [COGCC] permits hydraulic fracturing and Longmont
prohibits if'428 Judge Lammons, however, was more careful with his language, stating that the Fort Collins ban prohibits what state law "expressly
authorizes the [COGCC] to permif'429 On appeal, the defendants will
likely argue, as they did before the trial courts, that while COGCC has the
authority, it does not actually directly regulate the technical operational
aspects of hydraulic fracturing. 430
424See § l l.04[3][a], supra.
425 Longmont Order, supra note 35. See also Citizen Intervenors' Notice of Appeal,
Longmont II, No. 2013CV63 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. Sept. 10, 2014).
426 0rder Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on First Claim for Relief
and Denying Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, COGA v. City of Fort
Collins, No. 13CV31385 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Larimer Cnty. Aug. 7, 2014) (Fort Collins Order).

427Longmont Order, supra note 35, at 13; Fort Collins Order, supra note 426, at 8. Both
courts also considered whether "implied preemption" provides a separate ground to preempt the local ordinance, with Judge Lammons finding implied preemption and Judge Mallard declining. Longmont Order, supra note 35, at 11; Fort Collins Order, supra note 426,
at 7. As discussed above, "implied preemption'' by reason of the frustration of a significant
state interest seems to present independent grounds under Voss to invalidate a local law,
separate and apart from either implied field preemption or technical operational conflicts.
See§ 11.04[3] [a], supra. Both courts seemed to have some difficulty reconciling Voss and
Bowen/Edwards.
428Longmont Order, supra note 35, at 14.
429Fort Collins Order, supra note 426, at 8.
430Note also that the Fort Collins ordinance is a moratorium, not a permanent ban.
Judge Lammons considered the distinction without a difference, but also noted that no
Colorado appellate court has addressed the distinction in the preemption context. Id. at 4.
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Recent Colorado Supreme Court precedent informs the analysis. In Colorado Mining Ass'n v. Board of County Commissioners ofSummit County,431

the court considered Summit County's ban on toxic or acidic chemicals
such as cyanide in mining heap leaching and vat leaching operations.
The Mined Land Reclamation Board (Board) characterized the County's
ordinance as a reclamation standard, and the court agreed, granting deference to the agency's interpretation of its own enabling statute.432 The court
referred to Voss for the proposition that if a home rule city could not ban
what a state agency may authorize, then certainly a county could not,433
despite language in the mining statute that specifically required mining
operators to comply with local land use requirements. 434 Thus, the ordinance was preempted as contrary to the goals of the mining law and to the
General Assembly's decision to authorize mining using the controversial
chemical. 435 In a quote instructive to the hydraulic fracturing debate, the
court stated:
A patchwork of county-level bans on certain mining extraction methods
would inhibit what the General Assembly has recognized as a necessary activity
and would impede the orderly development of Colorado's mineral resources. It
would prohibit the recovery of minerals in areas where operations using cyanide
or other chemicals for mineral extraction can be conducted in an environmentally protective manner. 436

There are some distinctions, however, between hydraulic fracturing and
heap leaching. Colorado statutes authorize the regulation by COGCC of
drilling operations, including the shooting and treatment of wells, under
a number of statutory provisions for purposes that include the protection
of the health, safety, and welfare of the general public in the conduct of oil

431199 P.3d 718 (Colo. 2009).
4 32 Id. at 726. The dissent characterized the Summit County ordinance as simply the
lawful exercise by the County of its land use authority, expressing the County's conclusion
that heap leaching was an inappropriate use ofland in all zoning districts in the county. Id.
at 739 (Martinez, J., dissenting).

433 Id. at 730.
434 See id. at 728 ("Any mining operator subject to this article shall also be subject to
zoning and land use authority and regulation by political subdivisions as provided by law:'
(quoting Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 34-32-109(6))).
435 /d. at 730-31.
436Id.

at 731 (citation omitted).
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and gas operations. 437 In furtherance of the statute, COGCC rules regulate certain aspects of hydraulic fracturing, including fluid disclosure and
groundwater monitoring. 438 In contrast, the General Assembly has more
specifically considered and authorized heap leaching mining operations
through specialized application, permit, and inspection procedures.439
While Colorado statutes are broad enough to cover hydraulic fracturing operations, and COGCC rules regulate certain aspects of the process,
unlike heap leaching, the General Assembly has not imposed specific
requirements for permitting and approval of fracturing treatment and
arguably never expressly authorized the practice. This, however, is too thin
a slice to justify a different outcome. Just as heap leaching was characterized in Summit County as one part of a reclamation standard, hydraulic
fracturing should be characterized as simply one aspect of drilling operations, both of which are heavily regulated under their respective statutes
and agency rules.

[c] Field (or Express) Preemption in Louisiana
In the rare case where the court finds implied field preemption, it does
not purport to rely on the express preemption language in the state statutes. Field preemption is rare, and may be confused by the court. When
a court finds that the legislature intended to preempt the field, the court
then must define the scope of the field, and the definition can be important. Consider Energy Management Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 440 where the
court struggled with its own definition of the field preempted. The City of
Shreveport passed an ordinance that prohibited drilling within 1,000 feet
of a lake. Energy Management Corp. (EMC) acquired leases to drill in and
around the lake, and sued after the City made clear it would not issue a
variance. Even though EMC had not applied for a drilling permit from the

437 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 34-60-106(ll)(a)(II). More broadly, COGCC has the authority to
regulate not just the "drilling, producing, and plugging of wells" but also "all other operations for the production of oil or gas:' Id. § 34-60-106(2)(a). COGCC also has the authority
to regulate the "shooting and chemical treatment of wells;' id. § 34-60-106(2)(b), and to
"prevent and mitigate significant adverse environmental impacts on any air, water, soil, or
biological resource resulting from oil and gas operations;' id.§ 34-60-106(2)(d).
438 See, e.g., COGCC Rules 205A (hydraulic fracturing chemical disclosure), 316(C)
(notice of intent to conduct hydraulic fracturing treatment), 317 (general drilling rules),
318A.e.(4) (groundwater baseline sampling and monitoring for Greater Wattenberg Area),
324A (pollution), 337 (spill/release report), 609 (statewide groundwater baseline sampling
and monitoring).
439 See

Colo. Rev. Stat.§§ 34-32-103(3.5), (4.9), -112.5, -116.5.

440397

F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2005).
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Louisiana Office of Conservation (LOC), the court found standing to challenge the ordinance based on the devaluation ofEMC's mineral interest.441
The Louisiana law at issue provides, with respect to a drilling permit
issued by the LOC, that "[n]o other agency or political subdivision of the
state shall have the authority, and they are hereby expressly forbidden, to
prohibit or in any way interfere with the drilling of a well or test well in
search of minerals by the holder of such a permif'442 Although this language on its face expressly preempts local control, inextricably the Fifth
Circuit said otherwise.443
Rather than rely simply on the words of the statute,444 the court examined the purpose behind the statute like the Wallach court in New York.
The court nevertheless concluded both the when and the where of drilling
an oil or gas well were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LOC. 445 The
court then remanded the case to the district court for entry of a declaratory judgment that the ordinance "is preempted by state law and is invalid
to the extent that it purports to prohibit the drilling of oil and gas wells in
an area within the state of Louisiana ... :'446 On remand, the district court
entered the declaratory judgment language exactly as written by the Fifth
Circuit. 447
But were the court's instructions to the district court sufficient to preempt the entire field? In other words, even if a local government may not
prohibit drilling, may it still impose costly technical requirements and con ditions? EMC appreciated this problem with the Fifth Circuit's language,
so it appealed once again. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit realized how narrowly its holding might be interpreted, and sent it back to the district court
again, this time to explicitly state that the local ordinance was preempted

441 Id. at 302.
442La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30:28(F).

443 See

Energy Mgmt., 397 F.3d at 303 ("In this case there is no express provision
mandating pre-emption.").
444 See Kramer,

Governmental Relations, supra note 1, at 86 (other considerations are not
relevant when the legislature has spoken).
445 Energy

Mgmt., 397 F.3d at 304.

446Jd. at 306 (emphasis added).
447 See Energy Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, No. CIV A 97-2408, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43715 (W.D. La. May 5, 2005), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded by 467 F.3d
471 (5th Cir. 2006).
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in its entirety, including not just the when and where, but also "activities"
and "every phase" of operations.448

[4] Whether Local Governments May Regulate
Drilling in Ohio
Ohio will soon have new precedent from its highest court as to whether
a home-rule municipality may enact zoning restrictions that cover oil and
gas production since the enactment of amendments in 2004 to chapter
1509 of the Ohio Revised Code, the state's statutory provisions governing oil and gas conservation and regulation. 449 The Ohio Supreme Court
recently heard oral argument on appeal from the court of appeals in State
ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp. 450
Beck Energy Corp. (Beck) obtained a permit to drill in Munroe Falls,
Ohio, from the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR). The City
of Munroe Falls then issued a stop work order and filed a complaint in the
Ohio Court of Common Pleas, complaining that Beck failed to comply
with the City's zoning ordinances.451 The ordinances contained no bans or
severe restrictions, but required compliance with zoning restrictions, such
as obtaining a conditional zoning certificate, a zoning certificate, appearance at a public hearing, approval by the planning commission, payment of
fees and a bond, and right-of-way construction permits.452
The court of appeals analyzed the home-rule question under a three-step
test set out in Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde. 453 The first
step asks whether the ordinance is an exercise of local self-government or
an exercise of local police power.454 An exercise of local self-government
is absolutely protected by Ohio constitutional home-rule power, while an
exercise of the police power is subject to further scrutiny.455 If the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, the second step asks whether the

448 Energy Mgmt. Corp. v.

City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471,478 (5th Cir. 2006), remanded,
No. CIV A 97-2408, 2006 WL 3230777 (W.D. La. Nov. 6, 2006).
4490hio

Rev. Code Ann.§§ 1509.01-.99.

450989 N.E.2d 85 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013), appeal granted, 989 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio 2013).
451 989 N.E.2d at 88.
452 Id.

at 89.

453896 N.E.2d 967 (Ohio 2008).
454 Beck Energy,

455 Id. at 92-93.

989 N.E.2d at 92.
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law is a general law. The court of appeals easily found that chapter 1509 is
a general law based on unambiguous precedent.456
The court then turned to the third step in the analysis, whether there is
a conflict between state and local law, which occurs when an ordinance
prohibits that which the state statute permits, or vice versa. 457 Arguably,
however, such a conflict analysis should not have been performed. Chapter
1509 provides in relevant part:
The division has sole and exclusive authority to regulate the permitting, location,
and spacing of oil and gas wells and production operations within the state ....
[T]his chapter and rules adopted under it constitute a comprehensive plan with
respect to all aspects of the locating, drilling, well stimulation, completing, and
operating of oil and gas wells within this state .... Nothing in this section affects
the authority granted to ... local authorities [to regulate the use of streets] .... 458

The statute appears to expressly preempt all aspects of the regulation of
oil and gas in the state, other than the carve-out for the use of streets. The
court had no need to conduct an implied conflict analysis of each separate
requirement in the local ordinance. It may seem like a distinction without
a difference, as the court ultimately decides the extent of express preemption, and in the absence of express preemption, decides whether a con flict exists. By applying a conflict analysis, however, the court implies that
municipalities may still regulate in a manner that does not conflict, but the
court provides no guidance as to where such lines might be drawn. 459 In
this case, the court concluded that the municipality may regulate rightsof-way (based on the carve-out) and may require a public hearing, but
may not require a zoning certificate or approval, a permit application, or a
performance bond. 4 60
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court could apply an even narrower construction of the State's exclusive authority. During oral argument of Beck
Energy, supreme court Justices Paul Pfeifer (who also dissented in Clyde)
and William O'Neil showed their skepticism that the State should have the
456 Id.

at 96-97 (citing Smith Family Trust v. Hudson Bd. of Zoning & Bldg. Appeals,
2009-0hio-2557, 2009 WL 1539065 (Ohio Ct. App. June 3, 2009)).
457 Id.

at 93.

458
0hio Rev. Code Ann. § 1509.02. Specifically, section 1509.02 preserves the authority of municipalities under section 723.01, which in turn grants municipalities the special
power to regulate the use of streets.

459 See

Kramer, Governmental Relations, supra note l, at 89 (Court used "ad hoc 'operational conflicts' analysis that creates substantial uncertainty about the validity of almost any
type of sub-state unit regulatory program:').
460 State

2013).

ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 989 N.E.2d 85, 97-99 (Ohio Ct. App.
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sole authority to determine drilling locations.461 The state statute at issue
in Beck Energy, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ch. 1509, appears comprehensive in
that it governs setbacks not only from boundaries of tracts, drilling units,
and other wells; it also regulates distances from occupied dwellings4 &2 and
allows (but does not require) the Chief of the ODNR Division of Oil and
Gas Resources Management to specify minimum distances from streets,
roadways, bodies of water, zoning districts, and building structures.463 The
City of Munroe Falls ordinance seems to conflict with these state location rules because the City may prohibit the drilling of a well in a location
allowed under state law. 464
Location for one purpose, however, is not necessarily location for
another purpose. Much like the Wallach court in New York, the Ohio
Supreme Court might well conclude that the state scheme that covers the
"location" of wells was adopted for purposes of conservation of oil and gas,
and does not prohibit local regulation of well location for traditional health
and safety purposes. Such a holding would align with the dissent of former
ChiefJustice Thomas Moyer in Clyde, who was concerned with the "severe
blow to the underlying principles of local self-government:'465 Further,
unlike the ordinance at issue in Clyde, 466 the Munroe Falls ordinance in
Beck Energy does not absolutely prohibit an activity that is permitted under

461 See Randy Ludlow, "High court to decide: Is fracking subject to local rules?" The
Columbus Dispatch (Feb. 27, 2014).

4620hio Rev. Code Ann.§ 1509.021.
463 Id.

§ 1509.23(A)(2).

464 For

example, the city ordinance allows the municipality the discretion to deny a permit to drill if it finds an undue hazard considering such special features "as topographical
conditions, nature of occupancy and proximity of buildings ... , and such other matters as
the Municipality shall deem relevant to the application:' Codified Ordinances of Munroe
Falls, Ohio§ 1329.09.
4650hioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 896 N.E.2d 967, 977 n.2 (Ohio
2008).
466 Clyde concerned a state statute that provided a right for license holders to carry a
concealed handgun anywhere in the state, subject to a few express exceptions for private
property owners and private employers, who could prohibit concealed handguns. Id. at 968.
Shortly after the state statute was enacted, the City of Clyde passed an ordinance that prohibited handguns in city parks. Id. In striking down the city ordinance, the supreme court
found in its general law analysis that the General Assembly expressed a need for uniformity
in a comprehensive legislative enactment that created a right to carry a concealed handgun
if the carrier obtained a state-issued permit. Id. at 974. The conflict analysis applied by the
court was simple; the city ordinance prohibited an act (carrying a gun in a city park) that
was expressly permitted under state law. Id. at 975.
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the state statute. It does, however, require a permit as a condition to drill
and in some cases requires consent of neighboring owners. 467
Despite the possibility of such a narrow construction of the state's exclusive authority, the Munroe Falls ordinance not only violates the express
language in chapter 1509 but also appears contrary to the intent of the
General Assembly. Before 2004, Ohio law expressly allowed sub-state units
to enact and enforce health and safety standards for the drilling and exploration of oil and gas. 468 In Newbury Township Board of Township Trustees v.
Lomak Petroleum (Ohio), Inc.,469 the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged
that "health and safety standards,, allowed under prior law included the
division of a township into zoning districts, as long as the zoning was
based on considerations of health and safety. 470 Effective in 2004, however,
the General Assembly repealed section 1509.39,471 and along with it "all
statutory authority of local governments to regulate oil and gas exploration
and operation as well as limitations on that authority:'472 The legislature
must have intended its 2004 repeal of sub-state authority to include zoning authority as to the location of wells, because the Ohio Supreme Court
held under Newbury Township that such authority derives from the express
authority in former section 1509.39 as to health and safety standardsauthority that has been repealed.
§

11.05 State Alternatives to Local Government Conflicts?

Rather than become embroiled in litigation, state agencies may seek
alternative arrangements with local governments or encourage local
governments to work more cooperatively with operators. This section
describes a few of these alternatives at work in Colorado.

[I] Memoranda of Understanding
An approach gaining traction in Colorado, and a method oflocal government control favored by the COGCC, is an agreement called a "memorandum of understanding" (MOU) between drillers and local governments.
MOUs have the potential benefit of stricter controls while avoiding
467 See

Codified Ordinances of Munroe Falls, Ohio § 1329.08. The 200-foot building

setback under the Munroe Falls ordinance appears consistent with state setback requirements. See id. § 1329.07.
468 0hio
4 695g3

47oId.

Rev. Code Ann.§ 1509.39 (repealed 2003).

N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 1992).

at 305-06.

471 H.R.

278 § 2, 125th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2004).

472 Final Analysis at

(Ohio 2004).

1, Ohio Leg. Serv. Comm'n, H.R. 278, 125th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
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litigation at the cost of the local taxpayer. It is important to Colorado
sub-state units that have entered into MOUs that best management practices (BMP) agreed to by the operator are incorporated into the COGCC
drilling permit as "conditions of approval;' becoming subject to COGCC
inspection and enforcement jurisdiction. For this to work, a sub-state unit
that is a party to an MOU must verify that the operator has included the
BMPs in its application for permit to drill (APD) filed with the state. To
actually respond to community concerns, however, the BMPs in MOUs
must contain more than purely aspirational practices.
Erie, Colorado, for example, entered into MOUs with Encana Oil & Gas
(USA) Inc. (Encana)473 and an Anadarko subsidiary474 while a temporary
moratorium was in effect. When the moratorium expired amidst controversy, the MOUs became effective.475 The Encana and Anadarko MOUs
require the inclusion of certain BMPs in APDs submitted by the operator
to COGCC, creating enforceable permit conditions at the state level.476
But while these BMPs may be enforceable, they are drafted as rather soft
obligations. For example, drillers are required to maximize setbacks from
occupied buildings and residences only "to the extent feasible and practicable, as determined by [the operator] :'477 A number of mitigation plans
are required to be provided, but only "for informational purposes:' which
the operator "may revise from time to time during operations:'478 The
requirement to use dosed-loop systems similarly is limited to "minimize"
(but presumably not to eliminate) the need for pits.479
On April 30, 2013, Arapahoe County added substantive MOU standards
to its Land Development Code. 480 The code now includes a procedure that
allows an operator to obtain an expedited fast-track local "administrative use by special review" rather than a more comprehensive review that
requires county commission approval, if the operator executes an MOU
473 MOU

between Town of Erie, Colo. and Encana Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. (Aug. 28, 2012)
(Encana MOU).
474 MOU

between Town of Erie, Colo. and Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Onshore LP (Aug. 28,
2012) (Anadarko MOU).
475 See

John Aguilar, "Erie passes regulations on oil, gas drillers:' Boulder Daily Camera
(Aug. 28, 2012) (mayor and trustees praise agreements as imposing some of the strictest
requirements in the country while protestors urge leaders to stop drilling in Erie).
476 Encana

MOU, supra note 473, at§ 3; Anadarko MOU, supra note 474, at§ 3.

477 Encana MOU,

supra note 473, at app. A; Anadarko MOU, supra note 474, at app. A.

478 Encana

MOU, supra note 473, at app. A; Anadarko MOU, supra note 474, at app. A.

479 Encana

MOU, supra note 473, at app. A; Anadarko MOU, supra note 474, at app. A.

480 Arapahoe

Cnty., Colo., Land Development Code§§ 12-1901 to -1913.
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acceptable to the County. 481 Although the form of "acceptable" agreement
was not incorporated into the Land Development Code, a form MOU was
presented to and approved by the City Council. 482 The form expresses a
preference for closed-loop systems but does not prohibit pits, although
pits for the storage of other than fresh or brine water require separate
approval. 483 The form MOU also contains requirements for baseline testing of water wells within a half-mile radius of a new oil and gas facility,
spill reporting, emergency response plans, erosion control, and limitations
on the use of roads. 484 Similar to the Erie MO Us, many of these BMPs are
required to be included in state-issued drilling permits.485
In contrast to the more cooperative MOU structure, Commerce City,
Colorado, requires operators to execute an "extraction agreement" before
the City will issue an oil and gas permit. 486 Interestingly, the form of extraction agreement contains many of the same restrictions that were challenged by COGCC in Longmont I, such as a discretionary determination
of "appropriateness" of multi-well sites and horizontal drilling techniques
and increased setback requirements. 487 The form contains other requirements, such as hours of operation, noise, and water quality monitoring,
that COGCC could argue operationally conflict with COGCC rules. 488
While it seems to make little difference whether a requirement is contained
in a form agreement that a municipality demands to be executed or in the
text of the ordinance itself, to date industry has not challenged Commerce
City's regulations. While Commerce City has framed its requirements in
a different manner than the challenged Longmont ordinance, the substance is much the same. If the Longmont ordinance is ever invalidated,

481 See

id. § 12-1902 (use by administrative review); id. § 13-900 (use by special review).
See also Carlos Illescas, "Arapahoe County OKs agreement to expedite fracking applications;' Denver Post (Apr. 30, 2013).
482 See

Minutes of the Arapahoe Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comrn'rs at 10 (Apr. 30, 2013).

483 See Arapahoe Cnty., Colo., Oil & Gas Memorandum of Understanding and Land
Development Code Amendment at 2-15 (Apr. 22, 2013).
484 Id.

at exhibit A.

485Jd. §

19.

486 See

Commerce City, Colo., Land Development Code§ 21-5266(4)(g) ("Every Operator shall enter into an Extraction Agreement ... with the City prior to the issuance of an
Oil and Gas Permit:').
487 Commerce

City, Colo., Extraction Agreement §§ 5.4, .5, http:/ /www.c3gov.com/
DocumentCenter/View/3594.
488 Id. §§

5.8, .9, .11.
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the provisions of Commerce City's extraction agreement may be of suspect
validity, regardless of its form as a mandatory agreement.

[2] Local Government Designee and Liaison Programs
Colorado has included within its rules a local governmental designee
(LGD) program to foster local government involvement in permitting
decisions. 4 89 LGDs are given an opportunity to consult with the operators
and COGCC on issues such as the location of proposed well sites, mitigation measures, and BMPs during the comment period for well permits.
LGDs may also require operators to attend meetings with building and
surface owners before an application for APD is submitted. 490 On the state
side, COGCC has established local government liaisons (LGL) to provide
training classes, attend local public meetings, and assist local governments
in answering questions from citizens.4 9 1
COGCC may also enter into MO Us directly with local governments. On
May 6, 2013, for example, COGCC approved the MOU entered into by
the City of Greeley, Colorado and the Colorado Department of Natural
Resources. 492 Although the agreement does little more than recite COGCC
rules and understood delineations between state and local authority, it
does represent an olive branch, "memorializ[ing] the Parties' intent to
work together on regulatory matters related to oil and gas operations in
the City:'493
§ 11.06

Conclusion

Many states have left local government power over oil and gas operations
relatively unchecked. 494 While state legislatures may be more willing than
489 An

LGD is defined simply as the local government office designated to receive documents that must be filed with the LGD under COGCC rules. See COGCC Rule 100.
490 See

id. Rule 306.e.(l). The meeting requirements apply to building owners within a
"buffer zone" within 1,000 feet of a building unit, id. Rule 303.b.(3)0), and certain other
owners that are required to receive an "oil and gas location assessment notice" or a "buffer
zone notice;' id. Rule 305.c.(l), (2).
491 See

COGCC, LGD Newsletter (Fall 2013 ).

492 See Record of Proceedings of the COGCC at 12, 25 (May 6, 2013), http://cogcc.state.
co.us/Hearings/Minutes/2013/201305_Minutes. pdf.

493[d.
494 In

at 1.

contrast, the North Carolina legislature recently passed, and Governor Pat
McCrory signed, the Energy Modernization Act (EMA), N.C. Sess. Laws 2014-4 (S.B. 786).
Although the press focused on the fact that the law criminalizes certain chemical disclosure
in violation of the EMA, see Mike Lee, "N.C. governor signs fracking bill that criminalizes
chemical disclosure;' E&E Publishing, LLC (June 5, 2014), the law contains incredibly broad
provisions to preempt local authority, including those regulating land use, and gives the
state Mining and Energy Commission the authority to determine whether ordinances have
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local governments to balance the positives against the negatives of oil and
gas production,495 they are political actors as well. Even though the public appears to be split on their perceptions of natural gas development, 496
legislators will often hesitate to strip local governments of control, leaving
on the statutory books unclear or incomplete demarcations between state
and local authority. 497 The uncertainties inevitably lead to litigation, where
courts engage in judicial line-drawing that in other than the clearest cases
spawns more unanswered questions. The judicial response will often be
unsatisfactory to oil and gas plaintiffs. Even in states where legislatures
have attempted to limit local power, the courts appear to have strengthened
their efforts to protect that power.

been preempted under the terms of the Act. See EMA § 13 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 113-415.1). It appears to the author that the new section 113-415.1 contains potentially
conflicting provisions that may eventually be subject to litigation.
495

See Ritchie, supra note 12.

496 The

public also appears to lack knowledge. The University of Texas and the Pew
Research Center have conducted polls that show much of the public is unaware of hydraulic
fracturing and that those who have heard of it are divided roughly equally as to whether
they oppose or support the practice. See The University of Texas at Austin Energy Poll,
http://www.utenergypoll.com; Pew Research Ctr., "Energy: Key Data Points" (Jan. 27,
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/energy-key-data points/.
497
See Briffault, supra note 18, at 113 (state legislatures are reluctant to supersede local
land use regulations consistent with local exclusion of unwanted uses).

